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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND THE PER SE STANDARD OF OUTRAGE
MERLE H. WEINER*
INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 1982, Ann Ruple's husband answered their home
telephone each of the five or six times it rang, but the caller did not
speak. The next day, Ms. Ruple's twelve-year-old babysitter received
two telephone calls. During one call, the speaker asked the babysitter
if she "sucked cocks" like Ann Ruple did. On the following day Ms.
Ruple answered the phone and the caller said, "Hey, baby, how about
a blow job?" Because a tap had been placed on Ms. Ruple's phone,
the call was traced to Earl Brooks, the husband of Ann Ruple's
coworker.
Ms. Ruple brought a civil suit against Mr. Brooks alleging inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.' At trial, Mr. Brooks admitted
that he had made the two obscene phone calls, and the court admit-
ted into evidence a criminal complaint to which he had pleaded
guilty.2 Ms. Ruple spent most of her case-in-chief proving that Mr.
Brooks's phone calls had caused her to suffer headaches, to vomit, to
lose concentration on her work and household chores, to lose sleep,
and to fear answering the phone.3 Her medical bills totalled $133.99.'
After the presentation of Ms. Ruple's case, her attorney moved
for a directed verdict on the issue of liability, which the court granted.
The jury then awarded Ms. Ruple $5,000 in actual damages and
$15,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota upheld the directed verdict, dismissing the defendant's
contention that the jury, rather than the court, should have deter-
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1. Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984).
2. Earl Brooks had pleaded guilty to two counts of using "a telephone to call another
person with intent to terrorize, intimidate, threaten, harass, or annoy such person by using
any obscene or lewd language or by suggesting any lewd or lascivious act .... " Id. at 653-
54.
3. Id. at 655.
4. Id.
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mined whether the plaintiff had proven all the elements of the tort.5
It found Mr. Brooks's actions to be those which society has deemed
unacceptable, given the criminal statute regulating his behavior. This
fact, coupled with Mr. Brooks's knowledge that Ms. Ruple recently
had endured traumatic episodes at work and that she recently had
been fired, supported the directed verdict in the plaintiff's favor.6
Ruple v. Brooks, although not a domestic violence case, provides
an interesting backdrop against which to evaluate the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress within the domestic violence
context. Domestic violence victims7 face a variety of abuse, both physi-
cal and emotional,' most of it much more severe than that which Ms.
Ruple encountered.9 In recent years, domestic violence victims have
5. Id.
6. Id. at 655. Although South Dakota appears to accept "unreasonable" behavior, in
lieu of "outrageous" behavior, as an element of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, the supreme court in Ruple v. Brooks quotes liberally from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46 (1965), making it appear that its decision would not differ if South
Dakota required "outrageous" conduct for the imposition of liability.
7. This Article uses the term "domestic violence victim," as opposed to "battered wo-
man" in support of Elizabeth Schneider's observation that the term "battered woman" fo-
cuses on the woman, rather than on the harm or the perpetrator, as the problem.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice
in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 530 (1992). Also, the term "battered wo-
man" is one that domestic violence victims resist. Id. While some labels may be better than
"domestic violence victim," e.g., "a woman who has (or had) a relationship with a battering
man," id. at 531, concern about the length of this Article dictates in favor of the term
"domestic violence victim." Schneider must have faced a similar concern about economy
as she herself used the phrase "battered women." See, e.g., id. at 532; see also Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. REv.
1, 24-26 (1991) ("Because the term 'battered woman' focuses on the woman in a violent
relationship rather than the man or the battering process, it creates a tendency to see the
woman as the problem.").
8. This Article defines domestic violence as "the use of physical or psychological force
by one adult against another adult with whom there currently exists, or has existed, an
intimate relationship." Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1042 n.5 (1991); see also Schnei-
der, supra note 7, at 537 ("[P]ractical experience is blurring the distinction between physi-
cal abuse and other aspects of the battering relationship.").
9. "Battering may involve extremely severe violence, including punching, kicking, and
attacks with knives, guns, and broken bottles. Injuries include lacerations, fractures, dislo-
cations, unconsciousness, internal bleeding and death." Brief of Ayuda et al. Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 8, United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (No. 91-1231);
see also DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 1 (1983) (describing "beating" in these words of a
domestic violence victim: "[P]arts of my body have been hit violently and repeatedly, and
• . . painful bruises, swelling, bleeding wounds, unconsciousness, and combinations of
these things have resulted."). Battering causes one-fifth of women's hospital emergency
room visits. Susan A. MacManus & Nikki R. Van Hightower, Limits of State Constitutional
Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 269
(May/June 1989). Nearly one-third of all female murder victims are killed by their hus-
bands or boyfriends, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME
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increasingly relied on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a basis for suing their abusers,'( and courts have increas-
ingly recognized the tort in the marital context. Within the last year
or so, two state supreme courts have expressly held that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress may be applied to marital
IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1990), often as the culmination of a history of domestic violence.
POLICE FOUNDATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE iV (1977). Most battering rela-
tionships also involve emotional abuse. See Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Domestic
Violence, 45 S.C. L. REV. 543, 552-54 (1992). Even in the case of domestic violence without
physical violence, the consequences can be devastating. As the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas acknowledged in permitting divorce for cruelty based on emotional abuse,
A husband may, by the course of humiliating insults and annoyances, practiced in
the various forms which ingenious malice could readily devise, eventually destroy
the life or health of his wife, although such conduct may be unaccompanied by
violence, positive or threatened .... To hold absolutely that, if a husband avoids
positive or threatened personal violence, the wife has no legal protection against
any means short of these which he may resort to, and which may destroy her life
or health, is to invite such a system of infliction by the indemnity given to the
wrong-doer.
Butler v. Butler, I Pars. (Pa.) Sel. Cas. 344 (quoted in Kelly v. Kelly, 1 P. 194, 196 (Nev.
1883)); see also Farnham v. Farnham, 73 I11. 496, 500 (1874).
10. "Domestic torts" have emerged recently as a "trend in family law at the federal and
state levels." DorisJ. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in theFifty States: An Overview,
20 FAM. L.Q. 439, 586 (1987). The trend is exemplified, in part, by the cases involving
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress within the domestic violence context.
See, e.g., Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984); Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, Ill.,
810 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (N.D. Il1. 1992); Lewis v. Lennox, 567 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1990);
Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo.
1989); De la Croix de Lafayette v. De la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501
(D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. Aug. 14, 1989); Kukla v. Kukla, 540 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993); Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178
(Me. 1990); McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Hassing v. Wortman,
333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 811 P.2d 575 (N.M. 1991); Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985); Weisman v. Weisman, 485 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Baron v. Jeffer, 469
N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Murray v. Murray, 623 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio CL App.
1993); Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.
1993); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.
1993); Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369 (Utah 1988); Ward v. Ward, 583 A.2d 577, 578 (Vt. 1990); Criss v. Criss, 356 S.E.2d
620 (W. Va. 1987); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1974); Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d
632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988); cf. Whittington v. Whittington,
766 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that husband's adultery and fraud were not
.outrageous"); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77, 89 (1978) (stating that husband's
conduct where he forced wife's vehicle off the road, struck her, raped her and aided two
others who attempted to rape her was an outrageous intentional tort); Floyd v. Dodson,
692 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that blackmail of ex-girlfriend with nude
photos and cassette recording of lovemaking was probably "outrageous," but jury was im-
properly instructed that "unreasonable" behavior could give rise to liability for tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress). Often the focus of a court's opinion is on
another issue, such as interspousal immunity, and the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress receives only incidental mention.
1995]
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conduct."1 Similarly, law review articles have begun to analyze the tort
in the context of domestic violence. 2 No commentator, however, has
11. Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Me. 1993) (holding that multiple
assaults, rapes, and verbal abuse are sufficiently outrageous); Twyman v. Twyman, 855
S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (holding that marital relation does not impede cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or.
1978) (allowing cause of action where husband broke wife's nose, choked her, and
threatened her with loaded pistol). Various intermediate appellate courts also have ap-
plied the tort to spousal disputes. Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (allowing wife to sue husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress inde-
pendently from divorce proceeding); McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (same); Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (same); Ruprecht
v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1991) (recognizing cause of action but finding
that defendant's conduct was not "outrageous"); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1991) (same). Only two state supreme courts have expressly rejected the cause of
action between spouses. Weicker v. Weicker, 237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that
public policy dictates that the marital relationship bars recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1988) (same); see also
Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting the cause of action
for spouse's public consortium with another party). The recent state supreme court cases
have increased the number of domestic violence situations where the tort may be applied.
Three-quarters of assault victims already are divorced or separated when the abuse occurs.
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND
JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983). Also, much domestic violence occurs outside of the marital
relationship altogether. See Hon. Mac D. Hunter, Homosexuals as a New Class of Domestic
Violence Subjects Under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 31 U. Louis-
VILLEJ. FAM. L. 557, 571 (1992/1993) (citing Caroline W. Harlow, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Female Victims of Violent Crime 2 (Jan. 1991)) ("Domestic violence offenders against women
were spouses (9%), ex-spouses (35%) and boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (32%) .... ");Jane
C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Law Reform, 21
HOFTRA L. REv. 1243, 1270 n.142 (1993) ("Unmarried intimate partners are often victims
of domestic violence.").
12. The theoretical articles that examine the tort often fail to analyze its application to
the domestic violence situation. Daniel Givelber's article, The Right to Minimum Social De-
cency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous
Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42, 55 (1982), and Constance W. Cole's article, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress Among Family Members, 61 DENY. LJ. 553 (1984), are two older
yet very thoughtful articles on the topic of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
They demonstrate the need for an article that critically analyzes the tort in the domestic
violence context.
Givelber divides his analysis of the tort into two categories: outrageousness in the
context of voluntary agreements, Givelber, supra, at 63-69, and outrageousness in the con-
text of interactions between legal strangers, id. at 69-75. While Givelber's first category
arguably covers domestic violence, as the parties often have a pre-existing legal relation-
ship such as marriage or child support obligations, Givelber focuses primarily on cases
involving "an economic legal relationship." Id. at 69. The author explains that many
courts do not uphold claims of outrageousness "when the relationship is primarily
noneconomic-e.g., marriage." Id. He cites two cases for support: Browning v. Browning,
584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) and Weicker v. Weicker, 237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968).
Givelber's conclusion about "noneconomic" relationships begs the question of why courts
do not uphold claims of outrage when the relationship is primarily noneconomic-a ques-
tion Givelber does not answer. In addition, even if one accepts Givelber's dichotomy be-
tween "economic" and "noneconomic" relationships, his conclusion about the tort in the
[VOL. 54:183
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family context seems short-sighted given that cases existed allowing assertion of the tort in
"noneconomic" situations. See, e.g., Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978); Sheltra v.
Smith, 392 A.2d 431 (Vt. 1978); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W. 9, 20-21 (Wis. 1974). The emer-
gence of additional case law allowing the tort in "noneconomic" circumstances requires a
reexamination of the situation.
Moreover, by creating the separate categories of outrage in the context of voluntary
agreements and outrage in the context of "legal strangers," Givelber exposes the shortcom-
ing of his analysis in the domestic violence context. Givelber writes, "To draw an analogy
from criminal law, the events (in these two categories] were as disparate as random street
violence on the one hand and white collar crime on the other." Givelber, supra, at 59. Just
as domestic violence is neither random street violence nor white collar crime, but rather
occurs in its own unique context, similarly it deserves its own special attention within the
law of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Similarly, Cole's article, supra, while focusing on the tort between family members,
ignores any discussion of domestic violence. Instead, Cole primarily concentrates on cases
involving the deprivation of parental rights. While she also discusses other factual scena-
rios including breaches of separation and alimony agreements and abandonment suits by
children against parents, none involves domestic violence.
Nevertheless, Cole does formulate a proposal for applying the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress in the family context. She urges courts to examine causation
and the severe mental anguish components of the tort before analyzing outrageousness.
This initial scrutiny will weed out "petty complaints." Cole, supra, at 571. As for determin-
ing outrageousness, Cole recommends balancing the parties' interests. Id. at 572. If the
defendant's behavior is privileged under the law, then it cannot be outrageous. If the
plaintiff's interest has any type of legal protection, then the defendant's conduct is outra-
geous. Where neither party has a protected interest-or, presumably, where both parties
have protected interests-a balancing of those interests must determine whether the de-
fendant's behavior is outrageous.
Given Cole's silence on the topic of domestic violence, her proposal invites close scru-
tiny. Problematic for domestic violence victims is her belief that "[w]here litigation only
happens coincidentally to involve a family, the case should be dealt with as any other emo-
tional distress action." Id. at 570. It is questionable whether one can ever say that the
presence of a family tie is "coincidental," and by Cole's analysis irrelevant, to the applica-
tion of the tort. In addition, because she does not define "family," boyfriend-girlfriend
relationships as well as gay and lesbian relationships might be treated as stranger cases.
Also troubling is Cole's recommendation that a court first look for the existence of severe
mental anguish and whether the defendant intended to cause it. Traditionally, the more
outrageous the defendant's conduct, the less mental anguish the plaintiff must establish:
"Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character
of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. j (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The
traditional approach seems appropriate in the domestic violence context. A domestic vio-
lence victim who has suffered repeated instances of abuse yet stayed in the abusive relation-
ship may therefore be subjected to accusations that her distress was not severe. The victim
should be able to use evidence of the defendant's conduct to help establish that the dis-
tress existed. Moreover, it is too easy for a defendant to claim that he did not intend to
inflict emotional distress on his victim, but rather, for example, merely wanted to talk to
her. Cole even admits that the plaintiff would often face problems of proof. Cole, supra, at
571. While Cole's framework may eliminate frivolous complaints, it undoubtedly will also
bar recovery for deserving domestic violence victims in many instances.
Cole's balancing approach to determine "outrageousness" also is problematic. While
the tort currently requires outrageous behavior, her balancing approach makes conduct
tortious so long as the defendant's behavior has less social utility than the plaintiff's behav-
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examined the theoretical advantages or limitations of the tort for do-
mestic violence victims, or proposed any changes to it.1 3
This Article, which Ruple v. Brooks 4 inspired, inquires whether
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can provide a
viable remedy for domestic violence victims. The Article begins by
analyzing the current state of the law. The success of suits for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress generally turns on the plaintiffs
ability to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous."
In theory, such a showing should not be difficult for a domestic vio-
lence victim. Under traditional doctrine, there are four factors that
arguably support a finding of outrageousness in cases involving do-
mestic violence: a special relationship exists between the parties; do-
mestic violence typically involves a pattern of harassment; an abuser
usually exploits a known hypersensitivity of his victim; and a historic
and gendered distinction between public and private spheres persists,
which should make violence in the private sphere seem particularly
outrageous.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the use of the tort by do-
mestic violence victims is problematic under current law. Courts have
applied the tort inconsistently in domestic violence cases. The mean-
ing of the term "outrageous" is highly subjective, and allows courts to
hold that domestic violence does not qualify. If fact, the ubiquity of
domestic violence in our society presents a major barrier to labelling
ior. Id. at 572, 576-77. In addition, her analysis fails to address from whose perspective the
balancing occurs. In the family context, Cole states that "the ability to speak one's mind in
the family context has greater value than the peace of mind of the person listening." Id. at
574. Cole's judgment about the value of speaking one's mind in the family is her own; it
certainly does not represent the perspective of the individual who suffers the emotional
distress. Moreover, Cole's choice of words hides the true interests to be balanced. In the
family context, one is not balancing "the ability to speak one's mind" against the "peace of
mind" of the listener. For the tort to exist at all, the distress of the listener must be far
worse than mere loss of peace of mind.
Despite these criticisms, Cole, in but a single paragraph, comes close to this Article's
proposal. She advocates a finding of outrage where the "defendant violates an established
right of plaintiff or abrogates an established duty owed to plaintiff... established by the
courts or the legislature . . . ." It is this suggestion of Cole's, albeit fleeting, that merits
more exploration in the domestic violence context.
13. See, e.g., Daniel T. Barker, Interspousal Immunity and Domestic Torts: A New Twist on
the "War of the Roses," 15 Am. J. TR. ADvoc. 625 (1992); Scherer, supra note 9; Heather S.
Call, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Marital Context: Hakkila v. Hakkila, 23
N.M. L. REv. 387 (1993). In fact, one author advocates a new tort of spousal abuse with
one of its elements being "extreme and outrageous conduct," without analyzing the limita-
tions of this element for domestic violence victims. Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Woman
and Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1025, 1068
(1992).
14. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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such violence "outrageous" under existing doctrine. Further, current
law creates a dilemma for feminists who are reluctant to invoke vari-
ous arguments that underscore the outrageousness of domestic vio-
lence-for example, traditional stereotypes of women's role in the
home.
This Article argues for a per se standard of outrage whereby the
defendant's conduct would be outrageous as a matter of law if he vio-
lated an injunction issued for a woman's protection.15 Such a rule
would avoid the need for a subjective, ad hoc inquiry into the outra-
geousness of domestic violence. Upon proving that the defendant
had in fact willfully violated a civil protection order, the plaintiff
would establish conclusively the most important element of the tort.
By proposing a solution to the tort's current limitations for do-
mestic violence victims, this Article hopes to provide a useful remedy
to women who find the existing remedies (including the tort) inade-
quate. In general, the proposal may help victims shut out of the crimi-
nal justice system, either because the abuser's conduct is not
criminal,'" or because the criminal process is ineffective for domestic
15. This Article assumes the gender of the victims/plaintiffs is female. Approximately
95% of domestic violence victims are women. REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUS-
TICE, supra note 11, at 21; see also Joan Meier, Battered Justice, WASH. MONTHLY 37 (May
1987) ("85-95 percent of assault victims and two-thirds of domestic murder victims are
women."); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)
("Studies have shown that the victim of adult abuse is usually a woman."). Consequently,
women obtain the vast majority of civil protection orders under domestic violence reme-
dial schemes. Of course, domestic violence need not be male on female, but also occurs in
lesbian and gay relationships. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 542-45. Female on male
abuse also exists, although it is much less common. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 11, at 21 (reporting that in only 5% of assaults on spouses or ex-spouses was the
offender the wife or ex-wife of the victim). As both men and women can be subject to
domestic violence and as both are eligible to obtain civil protection orders under domestic
violence remedial schemes, this Article's proposal is not limited to use only by women,
even though it refers to the victims/plaintiffs as women.
16. Some abusers' actions, for example stalking and psychological abuse, may not be
criminal under state law. See Karen Brooks, The New Stalking Laws: Are They Adequate to End
Violence, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 259 (1993) (47 states have passed anti-stalking
laws); Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Vic-
tims?, 15 CAR.Dozo L. REv. 525, 553-54 (1993) (some stalking laws do not address the types
of threatening behavior experienced by domestic violence victims). Yet, noncriminal be-
havior may be sufficient to obtain a civil protection order under a domestic violence reme-
dial scheme. See Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 (1989). Even if a domestic violence victim
needs to prove that a criminal offense occurred in order to obtain a civil protection order,
see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006 (1989), her burden of proof is usually only of a
civil nature. Id. Moreover, much less than a criminal offense usually suffices for a violation
of the order. The District of Columbia, for example, allows the Family Division of its Supe-
rior Court to issue protection orders:
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violence victims.1 7 As a plaintiff can recover punitive damages for the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,18 the tort's punitive
component can function like the criminal law, thereby discouraging
violence. 9 As one author wrote, "[P]unishment is a central feature of
outrageousness. Defendants may be punished-stigmatized by the la-
(1) directing the respondent to refrain from the conduct committed or
threatened and to keep the peace toward the family member;
(2) requiring the respondent, along or in conjunction with any other mem-
ber of the family before the court, to participate in psychiatric or medical treat-
ment or appropriate counseling programs;
(3) directing, where appropriate, that the respondent avoid the presence of
the family member endangered;
(4) directing a respondent to refrain from entering or to vacate the dwelling
unit of the complainant when the dwelling is (A) marital property of the parties;
or (B) jointly owned, leased, or rented and occupied by both parties: Provided,
thatjoint occupancy shall not be required if a party is forced by the respondent to
relinquish occupancy; of (C) owned, leased, or rented by the complainant indi-
vidually; or (D) jointly owned, leased, or rented by the complainant and a person
other than the respondent;
(5) directing the respondent to relinquish possession or use of certain per-
sonal property owned jointly by the parties or by the complainant individually;
(7) providing for visitation rights with appropriate restrictions to protect the
safety of the complainant;
(10) directing the respondent to perform or refrain from other actions as
may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter.
Id. § 16-1005(c). In the District of Columbia, almost all civil protection orders include, at a
minimum, the language that the perpetrator must "not molest, assault, or in any manner
threaten or physically abuse" his victim. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 725-
26 (D.C. 1991), affid in part and rev'd in part, U.S. v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
17. See Brief of Ayuda et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 9-10, United
States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (No. 19-1231) ("The criminal justice system by itself
has proven sadly ineffective in responding to the problem of domestic violence. Police
have treated intrafamily violence less seriously than other crimes, and criminal prosecu-
tions are very rare. Moreover, even when the criminal justice system responds, its delays
have a profound impact on victims, who typically experience additional violence while wait-
ing for the system to work."); DALE H. ROBINSON, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FAMILY VIOLENCE:
BACKGROUND, ISSUES, AND THE STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSE 22 (1992) ("Law enforcement
personnel have been reluctant to prosecute domestic violence cases, which many consider
to be private matters between spouses and thus inappropriate for government
intervention.").
18. Givelber, supra note 12, at 54 & n.61.
19. See Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W. Va. 1978) ("Of signifi-
cance is the right to recover for the intentional tort. Our law before today practiced a
cruel paradox. Under the guise of promoting family harmony, it permitted the wife beater
to practice his twisted frustrations secure in the knowledge that he was immune from civil
action except for a divorce, and that any criminal penalty would ordinarily be a modest
fine. If nothing else, the knowledge of a monetary judgement with punitive damages may
stay such violence."); Green v. Green, 446 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (same);
Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 474 (1989) ("Wife
battering is so ubiquitous in the United States as to compel recognition of an intentional
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bel 'outrageous' and made to pay damages-because of the obnox-
ious quality of their behavior alone. In this respect, the tort functions
like the criminal law."20 Yet the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress also provides benefits beyond the punitive function of
the criminal law, as it allows victims to receive compensatory dam-
ages. 21 The tort can even be useful for a woman who has obtained a
tort cause of action, if only to afford one possible means for deterring the heinous
conduct.").
20. Givelber, supra note 12, at 55. But see Natalie L. Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's
Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 269 & n.19
(1987). Clark suggests that a damage award is not an effective remedy because it fails to
provide any physical protection for the victim, it provides little help if the abuser has little
or no money to pay damages, courts are notoriously slow in processing personal injury
actions, and the filing of such cases is likely to anger abusers and escalate the abuse. Id. at
271. Clark's first contention is doubtful because, as she later admits, "a successful suit for
damages teaches the abuser that violent behavior comes only at the money cost of the
damage done." Id. at 281. Moreover, because "one of the most effective ways to stop do-
mestic violence is to make clear to abusers and potential abusers that society will not toler-
ate it," id. at 279, an effective civil remedy would complement her suggestion of mandatory
criminal prosecution in accomplishing this goal. Clark's other objections do not argue
against making a cause of action available; rather, it should be up to the individual whether
she wants to institute a civil action, given the facts of the particular case. Moreover, while
the filing of a case may escalate the abuse initially, at some point the existence of the cause
of action should serve as a general deterrent. See also Mahoney, supra note 7, at 66-68
("[W]omen describe coercive violence escalating after separation-violence clearly aimed
at denying their autonomy. . . ."); Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res
Judicata, 24 FnM. L.Q. 127, 133 (1990) ("Requiring a brutalized spouse to assert a claim for
tort for harm inflicted during the marriage in a divorce action, some fear, may simply
enrage the abuser more and cause the wife more harm.").
21. Johnson v.Johnson, 77 So. 335, 338 (Ala. 1917) ("The wife's remedies, by a crimi-
nal prosecution or an action for divorce and alimony, which in some jurisdictions are al-
lowed to stand as her adequate remedies for [assault and battery], so far from being
adequate remedies, appear to us to be illusory and inadequate. . . ."); Crowell v. Crowell,
105 S.E. 206, 209 (N.C. 1920) ("As to the suggestion that the defendant could be indicted,
that was a matter for the state which has not thus proceeded, and a conviction would be no
reparation to the plaintiff."); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (Okla. 1938)
("[C]riminal proceedings and separate maintenance and divorce actions for the wrongs
committed by her husband... may be adequate to prevent future wrongs but they cer-
tainly do not compensate for past injuries.").
The size of the compensatory and/or punitive damage awards can vary greatly. See
Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALEJ.
L. & FEMINIsM 41, 47 n.18 (1989) (commenting on the low amount of damages in Gay v.
Gay, 302 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), and Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 344, 390 A.2d 77
(1978)); see also Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503, 505, 521 A.2d 1246, 1247 (1987) (award-
ing $18,845 compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages for several hundred
sexual encounters with her stepfather when she was between the ages of 11 and 17 result-
ing in psychological problems); Garrett v. Garrett, 49 S.E.2d 643 (N.C. 1948) (awarding
$20,000 actual damages and $5,000 punitive damages to wife for public beating by husband
that caused her lacerations, abrasions, bruises, contusions, and humiliation); Murray v.
Murray, 598 So. 2d 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. ExparteMurray, 1992 Ala.
LEXIS 789 (Ala. May 29, 1992) (awarding only $5,000 compensatory damages and $50,000
punitive damages for three separate assaults on wife, although husband's personal assets
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civil protection order and whose abuser has committed criminal con-
tempt or another criminal offense by violating the order.22 The po-
lice often do not obtain an arrest warrant if the batterer has fled, and
prosecutors and judges treat private complaints for contempt "less se-
riously."2" Even if the woman prosecutes the action for criminal con-
tempt herself, she is faced with a more difficult burden of proof than
in an ordinary civil action. She must prove every element of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt, 4 and the successful criminal con-
tempt prosecution will not provide her with compensation for her
injuries or punitive damages.25 Nor will she receive the additional
benefit of society labelling her abuser's conduct "outrageous,"
although a criminal contempt proceeding undoubtedly provides some
form of censure.
The proposal similarly may assist women who otherwise would
lack a civil remedy. This Article is less concerned with the domestic
violence victim who can establish a battery (aided, perhaps by compel-
ling physical evidence), than with the woman who cannot, for
whatever reason, establish that she has been harmed in that manner.
This Article focuses on the woman who has obtained a civil protection
order, i.e., injunctive relief through a domestic violence remedial
scheme, and yet continues to be abused, although perhaps not in a
way that is readily actionable under current tort law. For example, the
proposal would be useful to the woman who is not "assaulted" because
she suffers only verbal threats of future bodily harm,26 or a woman
were approximately $2 million); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(awarding $15,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for assault
and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and outrageous conduct including
defendant's throwing coffee on plaintiff, kicking her, slapping her, hitting her, and tearing
her ear); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Me. 1993) (awarding $75,000 in
compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress consisting of physical violence and verbal abuse).
22. Violation of a civil protection order constitutes civil contempt in 31 states, criminal
contempt in 20 states and the District of Columbia, and civil and criminal contempt in 11
states. Twenty-nine states make the violation of a protection order a misdemeanor offense.
Finn, supra note 16, at 55.
23. Id. at 45.
24. 3A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 771 (2d ed. 1982).
25. Criminal contempt sanctions are imposed to vindicate the court's authority. Project.
Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. xvi, 1083 (1994) [hereinafter Review of Criminal Procedure];
WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 704. Any fine imposed on the defendant is payable to the court.
See, e.g., Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 869 (3d Cir. 1990); Falstaff Brewing Corp.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 779 (9th Cir. 1983).
26. Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 31 cmt. a, illus. 1 (stating that words alone, unac-
companied by an act intended to carry the threat into execution, do not constitute an
assault: "A, known to be a resolute and desperate character, threatens to waylay B on his
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who misses the statute of limitations for assault or battery.27 The pro-
posal even benefits the woman who could successfully prosecute a civil
contempt action for the violation of her civil protection order.28 The
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress affords her the op-
portunity to obtain punitive damages unavailable in a civil contempt
action. 29 It also guarantees her compensatory damages for her emo-
tional distress, often not recoverable in a civil contempt action.30 In
addition, it allows her to prove her case by a preponderance of the
evidence, an easier evidentiary burden than the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard which exists in a civil contempt proceeding.3 1
way home on a lonely road on a dark night. A is not liable to B for an assault under the
rule stated in § 21. A may, however, be liable to B for the infliction of severe emotional
distress by extreme and outrageous conduct, under the rule stated in § 46.").
27. States often impose a one-year statute of limitations on actions for "libel, slander,
assault, battery, or false imprisonment." See, e.g., Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330
n.8 (N.C. 1981). The newer tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress sometimes
falls under the more general statute of limitations that applies to "any other injury to the
person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated." Id.
See also Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d at 1143 (holding that time-barred evidence of
physical abuse could be admitted as substantive evidence of emotional distress claim). But
see De la Croix de Lafayette v. De la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501, 1502-
03 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. Aug. 14, 1989) (holding that choice of statute of limitations
depends upon acts underlying the infliction of emotional distress and that one-year statute
of limitations applied to allegations stemming from assault and battery); Pournaras v.
Pournaras, Nos. 49936, 49937, (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1985) (admonishing plaintiff for
bringing suit under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress merely to avoid
another tort's statute of limitations); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 109 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (applying two-year statute of limitations to all intentional torts including intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 548 (Or. 1978) (holding
time-barred evidence of physical abuse inadmissible as substantive evidence of emotional
distress claim); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983) (holding cause of action for
intentional course of conduct is subject to same statute of limitations as assault and
battery).
28. Thirty-one states allow civil contempt proceedings. See supra note 22.
29. While a plaintiff can receive compensatory damages in a civil contempt action, see
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 868 (3d Cir. 1990), the amount "may not be so
excessive as to be punitive in nature." Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943
F.2d 1297, 1304 (lth Cir. 1991).
30. See McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The problems of
proof, assessment, and appropriate compensation attendant to awarding damages for emo-
tional distress are troublesome enough in the ordinary tort case, and should not be im-
ported into civil contempt proceedings."); In reWalters, 868 F.2d 665, 670 (4th Cir. 1989)
(compensatory damages were proper for expenses necessary to enforce rights but "no au-
thority is offered to support the proposition that emotional distress is an appropriate item
of damages for civil contempt, and we know of none"). If a court permits recovery for
emotional distress in a civil contempt action, the amount awarded should be offset from
any subsequent recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress under this proposal
in order to preclude double recovery.
31. Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 1083.
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The proposal provides the indirect victims of domestic violence
with a civil remedy as well. The impact of domestic violence on chil-
dren is often ignored. Yet, as one court has acknowledged, "In a large
percentage of families, children have been present when the abuse
occurred .... Even if the child is not physically injured, he [or she]
likely will suffer emotional trauma from witnessing violence between
his [or her] parents."32 The child who witnesses an outrageous act
could recover under the tort (and be benefitted by the proposal
herein) because the child, a third party, is a close relative of the in-
tended victim of the outrageous act.33 Similarly, other friends and
relatives of the victim also may have a cause of action.34
32. State ex rel Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
33. The Restatement recognizes liability for a family member's severe emotional distress
intentionally or recklessly caused by a tortfeasor's extreme and outrageous conduct di-
rected at another family member:
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if
he [or she] intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the
time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily
harm.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46(2). See generaUy Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d
923 (1951) (holding that five-year-old could state cause of action against father's estate
after she witnessed him kill her mother, was kept in the room with the body for seven days,
and was forced to watch her father commit suicide); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429 (Utah
1916) (allowing wife cause of action where defendant entered her home and threatened to
kill her husband by holding a gun to husband's head), overruled in part byJohnson v. Rog-
ers, 763 P.2d 771 (1988).
Through a caveat, the Restatement expressed no opinion as to whether the plaintiff
must be present when the extreme and outrageous act occurs. RESTATEMENT, supra note
12, § 46. Few cases address this issue. See, e.g., De la Croix de Lafayette v. De la Croix de
Lafayette, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. Aug. 14, 1989) (parent
could not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when sexual assault
of her child occurred out of her presence); Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824, 828
(Mass. 1988) (presence is not needed, but that mother and brother of sexually abused girl
lacked "substantially contemporaneous knowledge of the outrageous conduct" and there-
fore could not recover damages). Under current doctrine, the threshold for what consti-
tutes outrage may be higher if the plaintiff is a child witness to the violence rather than the
object of the abuse. See Surety Midland Ins. Co. v. State, 625 P.2d 90, 92 (Nev. 1981)
("[The requirement of outrage] is more difficult to meet when the act has been directed
against a third party in cases in which the plaintiff has been a mere witness to the occur-
rence."); Star v. Rabello, 625 P.2d 90, 92 (Nev. 1981) ("[T]hus far recovery is clearly lim-
ited to the most extreme cases of violent attack."). While negligent infliction of emotional
distress may often be the most appropriate cause of action for a third-party observer be-
cause of the actor's lack of intent, "[tihe great majority ofjurisdictions do not allow [this]
cause of action." LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS § 1.28 (1989).
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46(2); see also Slusher v. Oeder, 476 N.E.2d
714, 718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (husband had claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when wife was harassed repeatedly on the telephone by a man who intended to
[VOL. 54:183
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PER SE OUTRAGE
Finally, the proposal hopes to move society towards a recognition
that all domestic violence is outrageous."5 A Comment to the Second
Restatement, written over a quarter of a century ago, is still true: the law
"is still in a state of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort
are not yet determined.""6 By adopting the rule that violating a re-
straining order is per se outrageous conduct, the legal system would
validate domestic violence victims' experiences of harm, and move
closer to a recognition that domestic violence is itself "outrageous"
conduct.
Law is a language of power, a particularly authoritative dis-
course. Law can pronounce definitively what something is or
is not and how a situation or event is to be understood ....
Legal language does more than express thoughts. It rein-
forces certain world views and understandings of events.3 7
Tort law generally, and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in particular, frames what interests we value as a society and
prescribes how human beings should treat each other. Within the
known and comfortable contours of the law, the per se standard of
outrage for violation of a civil protection order will help mold soci-
ety's thinking about domestic violence. The proposed standard takes
the first step towards making all domestic violence per se outrageous.
Part I of this Article examines the current law and notes that the
theoretical groundwork is already in place for application of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in cases involving domes-
tic violence. Part II discusses the inadequacies of the present frame-
work. Part III sets forth the proposal for a per se standard of outrage,
and considers the advantages and possible criticisms of this approach.
I. ESTABLISHING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS OUTRAGEOUS UNDER
CuRRENT DoCTRINE
Society's sensitivity to the plight of the domestic violence victim is
increasing. Laws have proliferated that permit victims of domestic vio-
lence to seek civil protection orders proscribing certain conduct by
entice her into having sexual relations, even though caller avoided direct contact with
husband).
35. The tort affords "one way of righting [the] grievous wrong [of domestic violence]."
Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 643 (Tex. 1993) (Spector, J., dissenting).
36. RSTATEmENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. c. See also KAm" & KA",, supra note 33, § 1.24
("Its limits ... are still only vaguely defined.").
37. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Na-
ture of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 888 (1989). Cf Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking




their abusers.3" Furthermore, while interspousal tort immunity histor-
ically has barred women from suing their husbands for assault and
battery, or for any tort,3 9 courts and legislatures are steadily abrogat-
ing this immunity.4° Most women now can sue their husbands for as-
38. SeeMurphy, supra note 11, at 1265 n.117 ("All 50 states and the District of Colum-
bia now have some form of protection order statute."). In addition, "[i]n most jurisdic-
tions a protection order can also be issued as a condition of bail or pretrial release in a
criminal case." Finn, supra note 16, at 45. Statutes in 48 states and the District of Colum-
bia provide for ex parte orders, typically obtainable in emergencies and valid for up to 10
or 14 days, until the hearing on the permanent order. Id. at 51-52. The permanent order
normally stays in effect for six months to one year, although seven states provide no time
limit on the order's validity. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic
Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 163, 165 (1993) (citing Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Protection
Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement iii (1990)).
While all states and the District of Columbia make spouses eligible for protection or-
ders, persons living together as spouses qualify in 39 states, and only 24 states extend relief
to household members who are unrelated. Finn, supra note 16, at 46. Statutes in two states
explicitly provide that no order may be issued if a separation or dissolution action is pend-
ing between the parties. Id. at 47 & n.10. In addition, "[w]hile victims of physical abuse
are eligible for protection orders in 49 jurisdictions, victims may petition on the basis of
attempted physical abuse in 39 states and the District of Columbia. Statutes in 42 states
and the District of Columbia expressly permit an order on the basis of assault without
battery." Id. at 48.
A protection order obtainable under the various domestic violence remedial schemes
prohibits, at a minimum, an abuser from committing further acts of violence. Kinports &
Fischer, supra, at 165. The protection order may also enjoin other conduct, such as con-
tacting the woman, coming near her residence or workplace, or calling her at home.
Among other things, the order may also award custody of a child, grant child support or
maintenance, require the abuser to vacate the residence, or mandate that the abuser at-
tend counseling. Id. See also supra note 16.
39. See generally William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv.
L. REv. 1030, 1033 (1929); William E. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL.
L. REv. 303 (1959).
40. "During the last two decades, interspousal immunity has severely eroded. Many
courts have either completely or partially abolished the doctrine, and legislatures in several
jurisdictions have provided for intentional tort actions between spouses." Tobias, supra
note 19, at 435 (footnote omitted). For an excellent discussion of the development and
abrogation of interspousal immunity, see id. at 359. As of 1988, 31 states had fully abro-
gated the doctrine, 8 states had abrogated the rule for vehicular torts, 4 states had abro-
gated the rule for intentional torts, 1 state had abrogated it for all personal injury actions,
and 1 state had abrogated it where the death of either spouse intervenes between the
tortious act and commencement of suit. Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1208-09 (Miss.
1988); see also Clark, supra note 20, at 271 n.26 (summarizing state law on interspousal
immunity). Even in states where interspousal immunity exists, it will not bar many domes-
tic violence victims' claims. "[A]bout three-quarters of domestic assault victims are already
divorced or separated at the time of the incident." Finn, supra note 16, at 45 (footnote
omitted). In addition, some courts have indicated that interspousal immunity will not ap-
ply if the parties are divorced at the point when their rights are judicially determined, even
if they were married at the time the complaint was filed. Hudson v. Hudson, 532 A.2d 620
(Del. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 527 A.2d 281 (Del. 1987) (allowing intentional tort suit
where wife received divorce during pendency of proceeding); see also Goode v. Martinis,
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sault and battery." Also, state courts have begun to acknowledge
domestic violence in their custody decisions.4" Even the criminal jus-
tice system is becoming more responsive to demands that it reform its
practices concerning domestic violence.4"
While the law is becoming more responsive to the problem of
domestic violence, it is also becoming more responsive to claims for
emotional injury. The history of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is well documented." Before the 1930s, the law
awarded damages for mental anguish only if it was "parasitic" to a
traditional tort and an accompanying physical injury.45 In the late
1930s, several scholars criticized the state of the law and called for a
new tort allowing recovery for mental distress.46 The tort first ap-
peared in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 1948 Supplement.
Since then, a trend toward allowing recovery has developed.47 Forty-
eight states now recognize the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress as an independent tort.4" Of the states that have recognized the
tort, all but three have adopted the Restatement's formulation.49
361 P.2d 941 (Wash. 1961) (en banc) (holding that interspousal immunity did not block
ex-wife's action for assault and battery committed while parties were legally separated but
before divorce was finalized).
41. See, e.g., Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md.
334, 390 A.2d 77, 88-89 (Md. 1978); Gay v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
42. Cahn, supra note 8, at 1043-44.
43. Many police departments have reformed their practices because of litigation or the
threat of litigation. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir.
1988); Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F.
Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Thurman v. City of Torrington,
595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y.
1985); Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976, 980 (N.Y.), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d (1979); Nearing
v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983). However, the criminal justice system has far to go
before it is genuinely responsive to the needs of domestic violence victims. See supra note
17.
44. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 603-10 (2d ed. 1986); see also
Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as Independent Tort: "Out-
rage", 38 A.L.R14TH 998 (1985) [hereinafter Modern Status of Intentional Infliction]; Givelber,
supra note 12, at 43-45.
45. The one exception, however, has always been for an assault action. HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 606.
46. See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MICH. L. Rv. 874 (1939).
47. HARPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 609.
48. Modern Status of Intentional Infliction, supra note 44, at 1003-16, and Supplement at
70-91 (Supp. 1993).
49. The three states not adopting the Restatement's view still require the equivalent of
.outrageous conduct." Chedester v. Stecker, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (Haw. 1982) (requiring the
conduct to be "without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency"); Sears
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Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the
tort's elements: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct inten-
tionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is sub-
ject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm."5" In other words, a plain-
tiff must establish four elements to state a claim: extreme and outra-
geous conduct, severe emotional distress, causation, and an intent or
recklessness to cause severe emotional distress."' The plaintiff must
convince a judge, in the first instance, that the conduct is "outra-
geous," and the emotional distress is "severe."52 If the judge finds that
Roebuck & Co. v, Devers, 405 So. 2d 898, 902 (Miss. 1981) (requiring conduct that "evokes
outrage or revulsion"); Hall v. The May Dep't Stores Co., 637 P.2d 126, 129 (Or. 1981)
(requiring "some extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct"),
See also supra note 6.
50. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46(1).
51. E.g., Richard L. v. Armon, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (citing
Modern Status of Intentional Infliction, supra note 44 (these four elements are found in the
substantive law of most jurisdictions)).
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. h. Mental distress "includes all highly un-
pleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrass-
ment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that
the liability arises." Id. cmt.j. The comment continues, "The intensity and the duration of
the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity." Id.
Any physical manifestation of the emotional distress will aid in recovery. "Normally,
severe emotional distress is accompanied or followed by shock, illness, or other bodily
harm, which in itself affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe." Id. cmt. k.
See, e.g., Farman v. Farman, 611 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (ex-wife stated
cause of action against husband's second wife for making over 1000 harassing telephone
calls, which allegedly caused severe emotional distress evidenced by nervousness, consider-
able weight loss, withdrawal, fear of going home at night, inability to perform certain du-
ties at her job, and taking of tranquilizers). Evidence of medical treatment also helps
recovery. See, e.g., Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503, 511, 521 A.2d 1246, 1250 (1987)
(holding that total inability to function is not required when medical evidence exists to
demonstrate severity of distress). However, physical injury usually is not essential to recov-
ery. See, e.g., Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 332 (N.C. 1981); RESTATEMENT, supra note
12, § 46 cmt. k.
The issue of emotional distress is first a question of law: "It is for the court to deter-
mine whether, on the evidence, severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to
determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed." REsTATEMENT, supra note 12,
§ 46 cmt. j. There is at least one way that a court's conception of "outrage" can affect its
analysis of whether severe emotional distress exists: the burden of proving severe emo-
tional distress diminishes with the outrageousness of the conduct. "[I]n many cases the
extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evi-
dence that the distress has existed." Id. See also id. illus. 1; National Sec. Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Bowen, 447 So. 2d 133, 141 (Ala. 1983) (outrageous conduct included death threats
to plaintiff and plaintiff's children, holding plaintiff at gunpoint for more than an hour,
and gathering false evidence that led to plaintiffs conviction for arson); Croft v. Wicker,
737 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Alaska 1987) (outrageous conduct included sexual molestation of
14-year-old in close proximity to her parents); Reagan, 70 Md. App. at 513, 521 A.2d at 1251
(outrageous conduct included defendant's sexual abuse of stepdaughter hundreds of
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reasonable individuals would differ on whether the conduct is "outra-
geous," the jury must determine whether the conduct has been suffi-
ciently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.5 3  Then the
plaintiff must convince the fact finder that the defendant did these
acts, with the requisite intent,54 and that the defendant's acts caused
the plaintiff severe emotional distress.55
times when she was between the ages of 11 and 17). Simply, "[tlhe very nature of the
conduct involved can provide a guarantee that the claim for emotional distress is genuine
and serious .... When the acts of the defendant are so horrible, so atrocious and so
barbaric that no civilized person could be expected to endure them without suffering
mental distress, the jury may find as a matter of fact that 'severe' emotional distress re-
sulted." Id.; see also B.N. v. KK, 312 Md. 135, 148, 538 A.2d 1175, 1182 (Md. 1988) (know-
ing transmission of genital herpes); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. k. Therefore,
although this Article does not advocate a per se finding of severe emotional distress upon a
civil protection order's violation, recognizing such an act as outrageous may facilitate a
finding by the judge that severe emotional distress exists.
Currently, "severe emotional distress" is evaluated by an objective standard: "The law
intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it." Id. § 46 cmt.j. "[Tihere is no recovery for exaggerated and unrea-
sonable emotional distress, unless it results from a particular susceptibility to such distress
of which the actor has knowledge." Id. As most abusers play upon their domestic violence
victims' particular susceptibilities, the abusers should be liable for even an "exaggerated
and unreasonable" emotional response. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmL h.
54. For the tort to exist, the defendant must intend to inflict severe emotional distress
or be reckless as to that result. See id. cmt. i; id. § 500 cmt. a. Tommy's Elbow Room v.
Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1044 (Alaska 1986); Hearon v. City of Chicago, 510 N.E.2d 1192,
1195 (11. App. Ct. 1987); Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 505-06, 408 A.2d 728, 736, affg in
part and rev'g in part 41 Md. App. 130, 396 A.2d 296 (1979); Reagan, 70 Md. App. at 504, 521
A.2d at 1246; Richard L., 536 N.Y.S.2d at 1016. Rarely will a defendant admit that he in-
tended his conduct to cause distress, or that he consciously disregarded the risk that dis-
tress would result. Richard L., 536 N.Y.S.2d at 1017; Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619,
623 (Tex. 1993). "Juries, however, are free to discredit the defendant's protestations that
no harm was intended and to draw the necessary inferences to establish intent." Id. A per
se rule of outrage should help a plaintiff establish intent because an abuser who has been
served with a civil protection order is on notice that a violation of it may cause severe
emotional distress. A reasonable person in this position would realize the risk involved.
Additionally, because the abuser has been told of the risk, when he disregards that risk and
commits the act violating the civil protection order, he is subjectively reckless. The plain-
tiff's decision to prove intent to cause severe emotional distress, subjective recklessness as
to that result, or mere objective recklessness may affect an insurer's obligation to indem-
nify an insured abuser, see Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly
Causing Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY's L.J., 1253, 1307-11
& n.271 (1994) (discussing Texas Standard Homeowners Policy), as well as whether puni-
tive damages are available. Compare Floyd v. Dodson, 692 P.2d 77, 81 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984)
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). But see Sielski v. Sielski, 604 A.2d 206,
209-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) ("[iut is difficult to imagine an instance of domestic
violence that does not include the requisite element of evil-mindedness or bad motive" to
justify punitive damages).
55. Reviewing the case law, Givelber found "causation.., does not usually present a
barrier to recovery .... [T]he question of causation has been submitted to the jury solely
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"Outrage" has been called the tort's most important element.
"[D]espite its apparent abundance of elements, in practice [the tort]
tends to reduce to a single element-the outrageousness of the de-
fendant's conduct."56 Yet the definition of "outrage" has always been
as elusive, as it is circular. The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers this
unhelpful formulation: "Generally, the case is one in which the recita-
tion of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
'Outrageous!"' 57 Given this tautology, it is not surprising that courts
use various criteria to evaluate whether conduct is outrageous. It is
these criteria that determine whether domestic violence qualifies for
the tort.
Three factors strongly influence whether conduct is "outra-
geous": the existence of an actual or apparent authority relationship
between the parties, a pattern of harassment, and the defendant's ex-
ploitation of a known hypersensitivity of the plaintiff. All three of
these factors are normally present in domestic violence cases. A
fourth factor, that domestic violence takes place in the "private"
sphere, may also influence the tort's application. Therefore, under
the current formulation of the tort, domestic violence victims have the
tools to hold their abusers liable, although, as noted later, the current
formula for recovery presents problems of its own.
A. Existing Relationship Between the Parties
The nature of the parties' relationship is an important factor to
consider when evaluating the outrageousness of the defendant's con-
duct. The more power the defendant has over the plaintiff in a rela-
tionship, the more likely the act in question will qualify as
"outrageous."
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may
arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation
with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority
over the other, or power to affect [her] interests .... In
particular police officers, school authorities, landlords, and
on the plaintiffs own assertion that the defendant's conduct caused the suffering."
Givelber, supra note 12, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 42-43; see also Richard D. Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liabil-
ity for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1750-51
(1985) ("[T]he element of extreme and outrageous conduct is the central if not the sole
element of the tort.").
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. d.
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collecting creditors have been held liable for extreme abuse
of their position.5"
The relationship between an abuser and his victim should be a
factor that facilitates a victim's recovery under the tort, as the relation-
ship involves both apparent and actual authority. An abuser often has
actual authority over his victim .because of her economic dependency
on him.59 In addition, an abuser appears, from his victim's perspec-
tive, to have authority over her because he has subjected her to vio-
lence in the past, and can do so again in the future. He also has the
apparent (and often real) power to affect her interests by causing her
trouble so that she loses her job, housing, or friends.
Just as the concept of authority has significance for the tort, so
too does the concept of trust.
The conduct of any ... defendant who is in a peculiar posi-
tion to harass plaintiff or otherwise cause emotional distress,
such as a creditor, landlord, employer, or physician, or some-
one else in a position of trust or special responsibility, the basis of
which is likely to be particularly shattering or oppressive, is
likely to be scrutinized more carefully by the courts.
60
Trust is the sine qua non of a family or intimate relationship. Any
abuse that violates this trust should receive particularly close scrutiny.
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. e. The comment continues, "Even in such
cases, however, the actor has not been held liable for mere insults, indignities, or annoy-
ances that are not extreme or outrageous." Id.
59. "Other than fear, economic dependence may be the single most important reason
why women stay in battering situations." Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2, 3 n.1 (N.J. Super Ct.
App. Div. 1989) (citation omitted). "Economic dependence is frequently the reason the
victim returns to the offender." Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protec-
tion for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 801,
992 (1993) (citing National Council on Juvenile and Family CourtJudges, Model Code on
Domestic Family Violence (1994)). See also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223,
229 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (citing RichardJ. Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay, 38J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 659 (1976) ("The most compelling reason for an abused woman to re-
main in the home subject to more abuse is her financial dependency; this is particularly
true for women with children.")).
60. HARPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 608-09 (emphasis added). See Hall v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 637 P.2d 126, 130 (Or. 1981) (stating that employer-employee relationship "im-
poses on the defendant a greater obligation to refrain from subjecting the victim to abuse,
fright, or shock thin would be true in arm's-length encounters among strangers"); Rock-
hill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 28, 28 (Or. 1971) (en banc) (holding that doctor's refusal to
administer medical care was "outrageous," as a professional relationship between the par-
ties existed so that they were not dealing at arm's length). Some courts have recognized
that family relationships involve positions of trust or special responsibility. See, e.g., Bhama
v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that destruction of parent-
child relationship by custodial parent could be "outrageous").
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The importance of the parties' relationship to the tort's applica-
tion arises from the common-sense notion that parties who have a re-
lationship, legal or otherwise, expect more from each other than they
would from a stranger. While a woman may be cautious on the street
to avoid an assault, she drops her guard at home under the assump-
tion that her partner will not beat her. When her partner violates that
trust, the betrayal is more egregious than random street violence.
B. Pattern of Harassment
A number of scholars have detailed how a pattern of harassment
has been found to contribute to a finding of "outrageousness. "61 Be-
cause domestic violence victims are typically subjected to repeated
abuse, both during a battering incident and also over time, this factor
should aid a domestic violence victim's recovery. Many women are
"beaten as frequently as once a month, once a week, or even daily."62
One woman, for example, explained how her husband assaulted her,
fracturing her left leg and ankle, then approximately one hour later
assaulted her again by choking and threatening to kill her. From the
date of those assaults until she brought a civil suit, the husband con-
tinued to threaten her verbally with physical harm, "causing [her] to
live in constant fear for her physical safety." 63 It is, in fact, rare to find
a domestic violence victim who has suffered only an isolated incident
of violence, especially when one includes emotional abuse. What
makes the pattern of harassment particularly horrific is the fact that
domestic violence tends to increase in frequency and intensity over
time.64 Therefore, domestic violence victims should be able to em-
phasize the repetitive nature of their abusers' conduct and success-
fully establish its outrageousness.
61. See, e.g., William Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 48-49 (1956) (dis-
cussing high-pressure collection methods of creditors); Jean Love, Discriminatory Speech and
the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 123, 135 (1990)
(discussing verbal sexual harassment).
62. Jean Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992) (citing ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Wo-
men Abuse: Frequent & Severe (Springfield, IL 1983)).
63. Gay v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). See also Martin v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tenn. 1971) (husband "frequenly, over a period
of years, 'stomped,' beat, kicked and abused the complainant, appl[ied] the most profane,
vulgar, filthy, and insulting epithets, impos[ed] on complainant great fear and humilia-
tion, on account of which she did seek third person and police protection on numerous
occasions").
64. MILDRED D. PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATTERING, VICrIMs AND THEIR EXPERIENCES 45
(1981) ("[O]ne of the few things about which almost all researchers agree is that batter-
ings escalate in frequency and intensity over time.").
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C. Known Hypersensitivity
A defendant's conduct is more likely to qualify as outrageous if
the defendant deliberately inflicts mental suffering by exploiting a
known hypersensitivity of the plaintiff.
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may
arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly
susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical
or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may be-
come heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor pro-
ceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be
so if he did not know.65
There are numerous reasons why the domestic violence context
may encourage a finding that the defendant has exploited a known
hypersensitivity of his victim. An intimate or family relationship usu-
ally puts parties in such close proximity that each party is acutely
aware of the other's hypersensitivities. As one scholar has observed,
"[F]amily members are so interdependent, they are especially able to
cause one another unhappiness and mental distress."66 An abuser al-
most always knows exactly how and when he can most annoy his vic-
tim, and he usually behaves accordingly. In Ruple v. Brooks,67 the
obscene phone caller knew that the plaintiff recently had endured
traumatic episodes at work and also had lost herjob. The court, quot-
ing the Restatement, said, "[S]uch knowledge by defendant makes this
65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. f. The Restatement continues, "It must be
emphasized again, however, that major outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact
that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his
feelings hurt, is not enough." Id. The Reporter's illustrations, however, demonstrate that
most domestic violence will qualify as exploiting a known hypersensitivity. For example, "A
knows that B, a Pennsylvania Dutch farmer, is extremely superstitious, and believes in
witchcraft. In order to force B to sell A his farm, A goes through the ritual of putting a
'hex' on the farm, causing B to believe that it is bewitched so that crops will not grow on it.
B suffers severe emotional distress and resulting illness. A is subject to liability to B for
both." RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt.j., illus. 10. The domestic violence context is
somewhat analogous: the abuser often "puts a hex" on the victim by exploiting her known
fear of violence and threatening to harm her unless she complies with his demands. Cf
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369 (NJ. 1984) (abuser, inter alia, told his wife he would kill
her and cut off her body parts if she tried to leave him).
66. Cole, supra note 12, at 553 (footnote omitted). Cf People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127,
164 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (holding that former wife was "particularly vulnerable victim"
for purposes of sentencing defendant for his rape of her, where defendant used his prior
relationship with her and his knowledge of her mother's poor health to gain access to her
apartment where she was "alone, inaccessible, unprotected, and unable to protect herself
from the assault"), modified, 50 Cal. 3d 1157, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 973 (1990).
67. 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984). See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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type of conduct even more unreasonable."68 Moreover, the defend-
ant's knowledge that his victim is economically or psychologically de-
pendent on him, and thus more vulnerable to his abuse, may justify a
determination that the defendant's conduct is outrageous.6' Other
factors that traditionally contribute to a victim's hypersensitivity often
exist in the domestic violence situation: for example, the victim's
pregnancy or the defendant's destruction of his victim's favorite prop-
erty. The Reporter to the Restatement writes,
A, who knows that B is pregnant, intentionally shoots before
the eyes of B a pet dog, to which A knows that B is greatly
attached. B suffers severe emotional distress, which results in
a miscarriage. A is subject to liability to B for the distress and
for the miscarriage.7"
68. Ruple, 352 N.W.2d at 655 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. f).
69. See Clark, supra note 20, at 273 n.33 (citingJudith Gingold, One of TheseDays-Pow!
Right in the Kisser: The Truth About Battered Wives, Ms., Aug. 1976, at 51-52 ("Psychological
pressures restrain many women from leaving the [sic] husbands because they are raised to
believe that they must make their husbands happy. Some women therefore feel responsi-
ble for their beatings and may wait years for their husbands to change before they seek
divorce.")); see also supra note 59.
The role as wife or mother may cause a dependency that is economically and psycho-
logically dysfunctional. Jessie Bernard, Introduction to WOMEN INTO WrVES: THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MARRIAGE 12-13 (Jane R. Chapman & Margaret Gates eds., 1977); see
also SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER & THE FAMILY 135-36 (1989) ("[M]arriage and the
family, as currently practiced in our society, are unjust institutions. They constitute the
pivot of a societal system of gender that renders women vulnerable to dependency, ex-
ploitation, and abuse."). This argument becomes even more radical if one accepts that
most women are indeed forced into motherhood and heterosexuality. One rea-
son for this is utopian blinders: women's lack of awareness of existential choice
in the face of what are felt to be biological imperatives. But that is surely not the
main reason. The primary reason for the stunted nature of women's lives is male
power.
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 71 (1988); see also HUNTER COL.
LEGE WOMEN'S STUDIES COLLECTIVE, WOMEN'S REALITIES, WOMEN'S CHOICES 191 (1983)
("Whatever the society, girls are taught that the prescribed social roles for women include
becoming wives and mothers, roles which involve caring for husbands, homes, and chil-
dren."); ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 14 (1982) (stating that most women
choose marriage and heterosexuality in order to gain some protection from male
violence).
70. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 illus. 11. Pregnancy historically has been a factor
influencing recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See generally Bar-
tow v. Smith, 78 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ohio 1948), overruled in part byYeager v. Local Union 20,
Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983).
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Many instances of domestic violence involve either a pregnant victim 71
or the destruction of the victim's favorite property.72 In addition,
while the belief is not unique to the domestic violence context,
"[w] omen are stereotypically regarded as having a more sensitive na-
ture, and their sensitivities have often been jealously protected." 73
Because domestic violence usually involves several acts within an
"incident," or a continuing pattern of violence, 74 the domestic vio-
lence victim has a good argument that the initial violence made her
"hypersensitive," and that its continuation was outrageous. Several
courts have recognized that the onset of domestic violence can make a
person "hypersensitive." In Baugh v. CBS, Inc.,75 for example, a do-
mestic violence victim sued CBS for airing her encounter with a vic-
tim-witness program on its weekly news and public affairs magazine,
Street Stories.76 The encounter occurred in her home, after a domestic
violence incident.
Baugh [the victim] has alleged that Defendants' [CBS] per-
sonnel entered her home, and misrepresented their identity
in order to gain her consent to videotaping, all at a time of
extreme emotional vulnerability. Moreover, Defendants se-
lected Baugh specifically because an incident of domestic vi-
olence had just occurred; they therefore must have known
that Baugh was vulnerable, and took advantage of her posi-
tion. These allegations adequately state a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 7 7
Similarly, in McDaniel v. Gile,78 the court found the victim "was pecu-
liarly susceptible to emotional distress because of her pending marital
71. Cahn, supra note 8, at 1047 ("Battering often begins or becomes more acute when
a woman becomes pregnant."); Mahoney, supra note 7, at 20 & n.81 ("The accounts of
pregnancy triggering men's violence against women are virtually universal.").
72. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (defendant
killed plaintiff's pet Canadian goose, assaulted and abused plaintiff, destroyed plaintiff's
property, and violated plaintiffs civil protection order).
73. Finley, supra note 37, at 65. SeejACQUEs LECLERCQ, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY: A
STUDY IN SocLA PHILosopHy 294-97 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1949) ("Feeling plays a
greater role in the woman than in the man .... [S]he gives herself up to love more than
the man does. Love takes up the whole of the woman's life; it transcends the simple prob-
lem of carnal satisfactions; it completely overruns the psychical sphere .... Love means
more for her than it does for him. She needs the man more than he needs her. If he
pushes his advantages ever so little, he becomes the master.").
74. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
75. 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
76. Id. at 750.
77. Id. at 758.
78. 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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dissolution."79 The facts of the case revealed that around the time of
the tortious incident, the victim had sought a restraining order against
her husband."0 Just as Ms. Baugh and Ms. McDaniel were vulnerable
after the incidents of domestic violence, every domestic violence vic-
tim is potentially vulnerable after the onset of violence. 1
Research on why women stay in abusive relationships further sup-
ports the argument that some women are hypersensitive after the on-
set of violence. Lenore Walker's model of learned helplessness
suggests that the cycles of battering make some victims believe that
they have no control over the abuse and cannot stop it or escape from
it. 2 This theory has influenced the criminal law's view of domestic
violence." While criticisms of this view have emerged," the theory
may accurately describe the plight of some women and may help es-
tablish the outrageousness of their abusers' acts. Regardless of
whether a woman suffers from learned helplessness, however, many
abusers isolate their victims so that it is harder for the women to es-
cape from the abusive relationships. As one author stated,
A wife assault victim may be quite isolated. Her husband
may actively work at keeping her that way. She probably has
few friends or sources of support. If she does have friends,
she may never have told them of her home situation ...
The more isolated a woman is in her own home, the more
79. Id. at 247.
80. Id. at 245.
81. Cf. Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 336 (N.C. 1981) (holding that assault and
battery barred by statute of limitations were relevant to determine "outrageousness" of the
defendant's death threat).
82. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 49-50 (1984). Sufferers of
Battered Woman's Syndrome must have "become so demoralized and degraded by the fact
that they cannot predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of psychological
paralysis," a state of learned helplessness. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984)
(citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 75 (1979)). In order for a woman to
have developed Battered Woman's Syndrome, she must have been "repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights .... Furthermore, in order
to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice." WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra, at xv. Such women are psychologically
trapped in their abusive relationships.
83. See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377 (addressing evidence of Battered Woman's Syn-
drome at murder trial of woman who killed husband); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (same).
84. See, e.g., Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Per-
spective, I UCLA WOMAN's L.J. 191, 196-200 (1991); Cahn, supra note 8, at 1050; David L.
Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and
Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1056-57 (1989); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the
Problem of Transition: Perspective on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 23, 36
(1989); Mahoney, supra note 7, at 40-42.
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dependent she is upon her mate for any input about her
value as a person.8s
In short, there are many circumstances that support the conclusion
that a batterer exploits his victim's known hypersensitivity.
D. Public/Private Sphere Distinction
One final factor makes domestic abuse a prime candidate for the
tort: the legacy of a public/private sphere distinction. 6 The private
sphere has traditionally been a woman's sphere. The stereotypes of
the home environment and the woman's role there, as well as the his-
tory of protectionism by the courts, 7 suggest that it should not be
difficult to prove outrage in the domestic violence context.88 One
would expect the courts to grant a remedy that vindicates their stere-
85. JENNIFER B. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 87-88 (1979).
86. This dichotomy developed with reference to white, heterosexual, middle-class wo-
men. See BeaRBARJ. HMRS, BEYOND HER SPHERE: WOMEN AND THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 62 (1978); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv.
803, 814 (1990). In fact, "[m]ost systemic observations of hypothetical differences between
females and males involve white, middle-class people, both as observers and as subjects."
HUNTER COLLEGE WOMEN'S STUDIES COLLECTIVE, supra note 69, at 135.
87. The law has a history of protectionism for women. For example, and ironically, the
common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity had as its basis "her protection and
benefit: so great a favorite is the female sex in the laws of England." Townsend v. Town-
send, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 445). Another example of the law's protectionism appears in the historic
heightened level of care that carriers owed female passengers. As the court said in Berger
v. Southern Pac. Co., 300 P.2d 170,174 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1956), "To a female passenger a
carrier owes a special duty to protect her from insulting remarks, indecent assaults, or
improper liberties on the part of its employees." Such protection, when imposed over an
individual's desires, becomes paternalism. See Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort
Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759, 762-63 (1990); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Mo-
tives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargain-
ingPower, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 633 (1982). See generally Frances Olson, From False Paternalism
to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REv.
1518 (1986).
88. Other authors have documented how stereotypes of women affect recovery for
emotional injury. For example, Regina Austin explains that although many courts have
condoned interrogation techniques at work and summary dismissal for theft and dishon-
esty-despite employees' view that the techniques are arbitrary, insulting, humiliating, em-
barrassing, and painful-some courts have also given employees a few victories:
The successful claimants have been almost uniformly innocent, and most have
been young female service workers. It may be that courts are somewhat more
sympathetic to workers in this context, but a more likely explanation is that they
consider the female plaintiffs especially deserving of compassion because of the
emotional vulnerability that is associated with their sex and age.
Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress, 41 STAN. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1988); see also Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Ker-
ber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MicH. L. Rev. 814 (1991)
(presenting a gendered history of the law's treatment of fright-based injuries); Finley, supra
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otypical notions of domestic relations when a husband, who is sup-
posed to protect his wife, instead abuses her in the very place that
society conceives is the woman's sanctuary.
One scholar has described the public/private sphere distinction
as a "central feature of the current view of the family's place in history
and society." 9 It is a construct that is "accepted by historians and
lawyers alike and, moreover, by those who otherwise differ greatly in
their assessments of family and societal development."90 Historically,
gender dictated occupational life, with women's primary place in the
private domestic sphere, and men's in the public commercial
sphere.9' This distinction has been called the law of "nature and the
Creator,"92 and has profoundly affected the development of the law
and the legal remedies available for the wrongs men and women en-
counter. The courts often have used the label "private" to justify a
lack of intervention in and rectification of tortious conduct occurring
in the home, including the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.93
note 37, at 41 (explaining the significance of gender roles and gender stereotypes to the
development and understanding of tort law).
89. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family Histoy and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rv. 1135, 1138. See
generally Cahn, supra note 8, at 1083 ("The tradition of family privacy, of a separate and
private sphere for family life, is deeply embedded in the law."); Tobias, supra note 19, at
390 & n.177.
90. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 1138. While Teitelbaum suggests that the public/
private line-drawing employs categories whose "meanings are far from obvious," id. at 1165,
and that the distinction "seems to reflect a series of interpretations of modern conditions,"
id. at 1169, he nowhere dismisses the dichotomy as totally unsupported. Until 1971, the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution supported the separate
spheres ideology. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
91. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1165
(1988) [hereinafter Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women]; Deborah L. Rhode, The "No
Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE LJ. 1731, 1737 (1991)
[hereinafter Rhode, The "No Problem" Problem]; Frances E. Olson, The Family and the Market:
A Study ofldeology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1501 (1983). See also LECLERCq,
supra note 73, at 309 ("The woman's place is in the home: this may be called the universal
rule. Household affairs belong to the woman, public life to the man.").
92. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organiza-
tion, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of wo-
manhood .. ").
93. Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HIARv. L. REv. 1650 (1966) ("The
courts most frequently explain their attitude toward family disputes by referring to the
danger that availability of judicial relief could pose to domestic harmony."). Roller v.
Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), overruled in part by Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (1952), an
extreme case of family violence, illustrates some courts' reluctance to disrupt "domestic
harmony." In Roller, a father raped his daughter and was criminally convicted. A civil
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Whether one believes that the public/private distinction persists
today,94 or rather that the separate spheres have merged as women
have entered public life,95 certainly the images and stereotypes associ-
ated with the distinction linger. Therefore, the distinction remains
worthy of discussion. As one author stated, "Despite substantial recent
changes in gender roles, gender stereotypes have remained remarka-
bly resilient."9
6
1. The Tranquil Home.-One of the images associated with the
private/public dichotomy is that the home is a place of peace and
tranquility. For example, one commentator has described the nine-
teenth century home as "a bastion of peace, of repose, of orderliness,
of unwavering devotion to people and principles beyond the self."97
judgment in the daughter's favor was reversed, however. The court emphasized the need
for domestic tranquility and indicated that a departure from intra-family immunity would
leave "no practical line of demarkation which can be drawn." Id. at 789. The court de-
scribed domestic tranquility as "an interest which has been manifested since the earliest
organization of civilized government, an interest inspired by the universally recognized fact
that the maintenance of harmonious and proper family relations is conducive to good
citizenship, and therefore works to the welfare of the state." Id. at 788; see also Baron v.
Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Weicker v. Weicker, 290 N.Y.S.2d
732 (N.Y. 1968). This rationale also sustained the interspousal tort immunity doctrine.
See, e.g., Ebert v. Ebert, 656 P.2d 766 (Kan. 1983) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 647 P.2d
1346 (Kan. 1982)).
94. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Sphere Distinction, 45 STAN. L. Rav. 1,
22 (1992) ("[T]he post-industrialization distinctions are still in effect today.").
95. Census figures in 1991 showed that 69% of working-age American women partici-
pated in the paid labor force, compared to 89% of working-age men. Walter Mead, Domes-
tic Saints in the Next Revolution, WORTH, Apr. 1994, at 41 (citing 1991 census figures).
However, the average pay of women workers is still, on average, significantly less than that
of their male counterparts. Moreover, whether women participate fully in the public
sphere is questionable, as women hold only 6% of the United States House and Senate
seats, and only 18% of statewide elective office and state legislative positions. Ruth B.
Mandel, The Political Woman, in AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETIES 34, 39 (Sherri Matteo
ed., 1993). In addition, women still shoulder approximately 70% of household duties.
SusAN FALUDi, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN xiv (1991).
96. Rhode, The "No Problem"Problem, supra note 91, at 1753.
97. John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF
THE FAMILY 51 (V. Tufte & B. Myerhoff eds., 1979) (cited in Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at
1141); see also Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 161 So. 753, 755 (Miss. 1935) (holding
that insurance agent's denial of claim, calling insured a "liar," and implying that insured
was stealing stated cause of action). In Garrett, the Mississippi Supreme Court wrote,
All our modem notions of law, common and statutory, and particularly in this
state, comprise the requirement that the home is a place where the occupant and
his family shall be entitled, not as a matter of sentiment, or of morals, or of good
manners, but of positive law, to the right of quiet and peaceable enjoyment, free
from hostile intrusions, whatever the character of the offensive intrusions may be,
which includes, as its mere statement will prove, the right to be free from insults
inflicted by those who intrude themselves within the precincts of the home; and
that a violation of that right shall be deemed an actionable tort.
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More recently, authors have recognized that "[t]he family is tradition-
ally considered one of society's most sacred institutions. It is the
source of comfort and nurturance for its members. High standards
have been set for its functioning.""8 The home's peace and tranquility
have been characterized as divinely ordained: "We recognize fully the
importance of the family unit in our society and that peace and tran-
quility in the home are endowed and inspired by higher authority
than statutory enactments and court decisions."99 Courts, historically
reluctant to grant recovery for abusive words alone unless physical in-
jury results,1 °° had made an exception when the outrageous words oc-
curred in the home.10'
These tranquil images of the home contrast sharply with stereo-
types of the workplace. Traditionally conceived of as a male enclave,
the workplace has been characterized as a 'jungle: competitive, im-
personal, unrelenting."'00 As Professor Regina Austin has stated,
"The conventional wisdom is that, in the workplace, abuse can be a
legitimate instrument of worker control and an appropriate form of
discipline. By 'abuse' I mean treatment that is intentionally emotion-
ally painful, offensive, or insulting."' Given that the public sphere in
general and the workplace in particular are stereotypically male,'0 4
with the attendant characteristics, women have faced a high threshold
for establishing workplace behavior as outrageous.
With occasional notable exceptions . . .sexual harassment
victims have rarely found relief through tort law. The men
Id.
98. Sandra Wexler, Battered Women and Public Policy, in WOMEN, POWER, & PoLicv 184-85
(Ellen Boneparth ed., 1982). Cf Gavison, supra note 94, at 23 (declaring that the family "is
the realm of affection, love, harmony, and cooperation").
99. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977) (prospectively abolishing inter-
spousal tort immunity for willful and intentional torts).
100. See W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Civil Liability for Insulting or Abusive Language Not
Amounting to Defamation, 15 A.LR.2D 108 (1951).
101. HARPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 613-14.
102. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 1140-41.
103. Austin, supra note 88, at 1. Austin also acknowledges, albeit unintentionally, the
private/public sphere division. She indicates that courts, at times, do not allow employers
to extend their control beyond the workplace into the homes of their employees. "Em-
ployers have attempted to extend their control beyond the workplace into the homes and
private lives of their employees. The courts in outrage cases have sometimes allowed work-
ers a sphere of privacy in which the employers' concerns are not given priority." Id. at 8
n.26.
104. See Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, supra note 91, at 1202 ("Despite sub-
stantial progress over the last quarter century, workplace cultures continue to devalue the
traits and priorities historically associated with women."); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th
Cir. 1983) (observing that Title VII "does not require employers to extirpate all signs of
centuries-old prejudice").
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who rendered decisions in the judicial system, and who, it is
safe to assume, had never themselves experienced sexual
harassment, failed to see the complained-of conduct as suffi-
ciently outrageous to warrant imposition of liability for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. It was assumed
that persons of ordinary sensibilities (that is, persons very
much like the male decision-makers) would not be offended
by conduct common in the workplace. 10 5
The private/public sphere distinction historically posed a double
disadvantage for women by isolating them from the law in the private
sphere and preventing them from recovering in the public sphere.
However, the distinction could conceivably assist them in arguing that
domestic violence should be actionable as intentional infliction of
emotional distress. It would be consistent with the courts' near rever-
ence for domestic tranquility and the accepted view that the work-
place is emotionally painful to label violence in the private sphere
outrageous. 106
2. A Husband Is To Protect His Wife.-Another stereotype might
also afford a basis for finding domestic violence to be outrageous: his-
torically, a husband was supposed to protect his wife. William Black-
stone explained the traditional ideal: "[T]he very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated with that of the husband: under
whose wing, protection, and cover she performs everything .... 7
In Bradwell v. Illinois,"08 for example, Justice Bradley, in trying to jus-
tify the prohibition against women's practice of law in Illinois, wrote,
"[T] he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, women's protector and defender."10' 9 The im-
age persists into the twentieth century: It has been said,
[T]here grew up in Christian society a whole body of cus-
toms which oblige the man to serve the woman, to respect
105. Finley, supra note 37, at 55; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VANn. L. REv. 1183, 1203 (1989) (reviewing judicial
opinions in Title VII sexual harassment cases and noting that "a characteristically 'male'
view, which depicts sexual taunts, inquiries or magazines as a comparatively harmless
amusement, or as the treatment women should expect when they push their way into the
workplace, pervades many recent opinions").
106. Scherer, supra note 9, at 545 (noting that "domestic abuse typically occurs in a
home setting").
107. 1 WiLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
108. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
109. Id. at 141 (BradleyJ, concurring).
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her in the full sense of the word. There is the duty of protec-
tion: the man must toil for the woman; he has to defend her
if she is attacked; he must attend to her welfare before look-
ing out for his own .... "0
Even today, a husband has a legal duty to protect his wife, and breach
of the duty can result in criminal liability in some states. 1 Conse-
quently, it is arguable that a batterer's abuse of the very one whom he
has a duty to protect should facilitate a finding of outrageous conduct.
3. Woman as a Moral Icon.-Women's role as homemaker has
been glorified throughout this nation's history. As one author stated,
"The glorification of marriage has had to be built into our society.
One way has been to profess great respect, even reverence, for the
role of wife, to accord it high moral, if not legal, status." 12 During the
1800s, the cult of domesticity developed. Society exalted, albeit for
some women only, the importance of the home and the role of home-
maker."' The positions of wives in the nineteenth century "were de-
fined by a purity and altruism directly opposed to everything found in
the larger world, and their functions were to 'provide moral uplift for
everyone else with whom they came in contact-chiefly their hus-
bands and children."'11 During the Cold War, society again empha-
sized that marriage and motherhood were the only appropriate roles
for women and that the mother was "a symbol of stability and secur-
ity." 15 This view of women as moral icons did not extend simply to
wives and mothers. Segments of society have perceived women as ven-
erated madonnas whose "guise is self-sacrificing, pure, and con-
tent."" 6 Even today, seeing these stereotypical characteristics as
110. LECLERCQ, supra note 73, at 316.
111. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. Sco-r, CRIMINAL LAw § 26, at 184 (1972) ("The
common law imposes affirmative duties upon ... husbands to aid their wives .... Thus [a
husband] may be guilty of criminal homicide ... for failure to aid his imperiled wife ....
Action may be required to thwart the threatened perils of nature (e.g., to combat sickness,
to ward off starvation or the elements); or it may be required to protect against threatened
acts by third persons."); see also CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 173, at 287
(1979) ("If a husband fails to supply his wife with clothing or shelter, thereby causing her
death by freezing or exposure, he is guilty of manslaughter.").
112. Bernard, supra note 69, at 11. The author continues, "Still, despite the high status
professed for it, the wife has, since the 18th century, suffered a relative loss of status." Id.
113. ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF MODERN
FEMINISM 1-27 (1982) (discussing Edward Clarke's theory on the importance of separate
spheres and the dangers of educating women).
114. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 1142 (quoting John Demos, The American Family in
Past Time, 43 AM. SCHOLAR 422, 433-34 (1974)).
115. Charnallas & Kerber, supra note 88, at 859 (noting that many elements of American
society sought to preserve the cult of domesticity in the 1960s).
116. HUNTER COLLEGE WOMEN'S STUDIES COLLECTIVE, supra note 69, at 31.
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strengths rather than weaknesses, cultural feminists claim that "wo-
men are more nurturant, caring, loving and responsible to others
than are men." 17 The image of a man abusing a moral icon should
evoke a certain sense of outrage and aid recovery under a theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In sum, the traditional conception of gender roles might support
a finding that domestic violence is "outrageous." One would expect
the courts to grant a remedy when a woman suffers abuse in her "sanc-
tuary," the home, at the hands of her putative protector. In fact, how-
ever, courts have inconsistently applied the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the context of domestic violence.
Undoubtedly, these inconsistent outcomes discourage victims from
seeking redress through the tort.
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE PRESENT APPROACH
A. Inconsistencies Exist
Courts that have addressed the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in the context of domestic violence have taken in-
consistent approaches that have resulted in inconsistent outcomes. A
brief examination of six cases illustrates the various approaches, and
illustrates that there is no consensus on at least one key issue: how to
analyze the element of "outrageousness" in a domestic violence
situation. 1 8
In Davis v. Bostick," 9 the Supreme Court of Oregon allowed the
cause of action in a domestic violence case involving physical violence.
Lesa Rae Davis and John Bostick had been married for nine years
when they separated in May 1973. Shortly after the separation, as the
parties were returning from a trip with their children, Bostick struck
his wife and broke her nose. Later in the year, Bostick began calling
Davis's home and workplace, threatening and abusing her. The calls
continued for approximately two years. In late 1973, he choked her
and threatened to kill both her and her male friends. During the
following year, he accused her in public of obtaining an abortion,
threatened to kill her, and destroyed some of her personal property.
117. West, supra note 69, at 17-18 (discussing Gilligan's thesis on gender differences in
moral development).
118. Hassing v. Wortman, 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d
1320 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 811 P.2d 575 (N.M. 1991); Murphy v. Murphy, 486
N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978); Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991), aff'd, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993).
119. 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978).
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After the parties' divorce in 1975, Bostick destroyed more of Davis's
property, threatened her with a loaded pistol, damaged her boy-
friend's pickup truck, told Davis and others that she had a fatal mental
illness, called Davis's future mother-in-law obscene names, harassed
Davis's mother, and again threatened to kill Davis. The jury returned
a verdict awarding $7,500 in general damages and $10,000 in punitive
damages for this "intentional course of conduct designed to inflict
emotional stress and mental anguish."'20 The appellate court charac-
terized Bostick's conduct as "to put it mildly, outrageous in the
extreme."
121
The defendant in Davis had argued, inter alia, that none of the
incidents occurring during the marriage should have gone to the jury;
he asserted that where no physical injury exists, interspousal immunity
should apply. The court flatly rejected that suggestion. Oregon had
already abolished interspousal immunity for intentional torts, and the
court refused to carve out an exception for the intentional tort of
emotional distress. The court rejected the argument that a flood of
litigation would occur, pointing to its experience with the abolition of
interspousal immunity for other intentional torts, and noting that the
burden of proof would protect against unwarranted litigation. The
court concluded its discussion by quoting Professor Prosser: "It is the
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the ex-
pense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incom-
petence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such
grounds.' 22 In the course of its discussion, the court commented
that a jury "fairly could" reach the conclusion that this conduct was
outrageous and caused severe emotional distress.' 23
In Massey v. Massey,' 24 a case involving no physical violence
against the plaintiff, the jury awarded the plaintiff $362,000 for her
emotional distress. The appellate court upheld the award. The facts
indicated that the husband, over the course of a twenty-two year mar-
riage, was "abusive, explosive, and rageful. He constantly engaged in
verbal abuse such as criticism and blaming, and he belittled [his wife]
in front of her children. He had temper tantrums and physical out-
bursts which sometimes involved the destruction of property."125
120. Id. at 545-46.
121. Id. at 546.
122. Id. at 546-47 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 at
51 (4th ed. 1971)).
123. Id. at 546.
124. 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
125. Id. at 399.
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While these outbursts caused the plaintiff "intense anxiety and fear,"
he never physically assaulted her.126 Other torment by the defendant
included his "tight control over money and his threats that [his wife]
would be penniless if she divorced him," as well as threats "to tell her
children and her friends of her extramarital affair and to take custody
of her youngest daughter from her.""2 7 He was also "rude to her
friends" and "embarrassed her in front of others." 2 ' The jury specifi-
cally found that the defendant had not acted with malice. Conse-
quently, it failed to award exemplary damages.'29
While the Supreme Court of Oregon and the Texas Court of Ap-
peals recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the domestic violence context, and found the defendants' behavior
to be outrageous, not all courts permit the tort' 0 or find that domes-
tic violence satisfies the "extreme and outrageous conduct"
requirement.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, for example, adopted a differ-
ent approach in Hakkila v. Hakkila."' While recognizing the tort in
the marital context, the court set a high threshold for what consti-
tuted outrageous conduct. Consequently, it held as a matter of law
that the plaintiffs claim lacked merit, although she had prevailed be-
low. The trial court had found,
[Husband] on occasions throughout the marriage and con-
tinuing until the separation:
a. assaulted and battered [wife],32
b. insulted [wife] in the presence of guests, friends,
relatives, and foreign dignitaries,
c. screamed at [wife] at home and in the presence of
others,
d. on one occasion locked [wife] out of the residence
overnight in the dead of winter while she had nothing on but
a robe,




129. Id. at 400.
130. See, e.g., Weicker v. Weicker, 237 N.E.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. 1968) (refusing to permit a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress between spouses, although
New York recognized the tort generally).
131. 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
132. The assault and battery included grabbing the wife during an argument and throw-
ing her face-down across the room into a pot of dirt, as well as slamming part of a camper
shell down on her head and the trunk lid down on her hands. Id. at 1322.
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e. made repeated demeaning remarks regarding
[wife's] sexuality,
f. continuously stated to [wife] that she was crazy, in-
sane, and incompetent,
g. refused to allow [wife] to pursue schooling and
hobbies,
h. refused to participate in normal marital relation-
ship with [wife] which ultimately resulted in only having sex-
ual relations with [wife] on four occasions in the last three
years of the marriage,
i. blamed his sexual inadequacies upon [wife].33
This course of conduct, while egregious, was not held to be "outra-
geous" as a matter of law.
1 3 4
A striking example of judicial inconsistency on whether domestic
violence constitutes outrageous behavior appears in Hassing v. Wort-
man. 13 In Hassing, a woman brought a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress against her ex-husband, who had harassed her
for over a year by sending her annoying letters, driving by her house
ten to fifteen times a month, crawling in the bushes around her
house, entering her home through an unlocked door, trying to force
her car over to the side of the road, investigating the background of
her new boyfriend, and sending a Christmas letter to relatives accus-
ing her of being pregnant by another man when she married the de-
fendant. He also contacted her employer for the purpose of
disadvantaging her in ajob. The plaintiff was afraid of the defendant,
and even hired a security guard for her second wedding.136 As to the
issue of outrage, the court stated,
It is doubtful whether the defendant's actions in this case
amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct. He did not
threaten the plaintiffs safety in any way .... While the de-
fendant acted in a childish, irresponsible, and inconsiderate
fashion, it is doubtful whether his conduct constituted a suf-
ficient basis upon which liability could be imposed, on the
plaintiffs theory of the case.1 3 7
The dissent, in direct contrast, stated,
Among the most treasured of the rights a citizen possesses is
the right to privacy, the right to be left alone. The accidental
133. Id. at 1321.
134. Id. at 1327.
135. 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983).
136. Id. at 766.
137. Id. at 767.
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intrusions on one's right to be left alone necessitated by the
complications of an urbanized society are burden enough to
bear by any reasonably sensitive person. The deliberate
harassing intrusions, repeated frequently and for a contin-
ued period, are savage, uncivilized, and outrageous. I reject
outright the conclusion that the conduct here is not suffi-
ciently horrid to be classified as outrageous.13 8
There was a similar division in Murphy v. Murphy."3 9 The majority
upheld the jury verdict of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and called the defendant's acts "'outrageous' beyond peradven-
ture." t40 The dissent argued that the plaintiff had "voluntarily en-
dured" the defendant's misconduct for nine years, choosing to return
to him after he declared the relationship at an end. 4 ' The dissent
ignored evidence indicating that the plaintiff had previously sought
relief from the defendant's abuse by obtaining court orders and a war-
rant for defendant's arrest, and by summoning the police to protect
her and her property.14 2
No decision better reflects the divergence of opinion on what
constitutes "outrageousness" in a domestic violence situation than
Twyman v. Twyman.' 3 Ms. Twyman's divorce petition included a gen-
eral claim for emotional harm. The petition alleged that her husband
"intentionally and cruelly" attempted to engage her in "deviate sexual
acts."' 4 4 At trial she testified that her husband "pursued sadomasoch-
istic bondage activities with her, even though he knew that she feared
such activities because she had been raped at knife-point before their
marriage."145 As a result of her husband's activity and demands, the
plaintiff testified that she suffered "utter despair" and "devastation," as
well as weight loss and an incident of prolonged vaginal bleeding.' 46
The psychological pain and humiliation caused her to seek help from
three professional counselors.147  The trial court found that Mr.
138. Id. at 771 (White, J., dissenting).
139. 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
140. Id. at 459.
141. Id. at 460 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) ("In August 1981, plaintiff began a written seri-
alization of defendant's acts of assault, threats, neglect and property destruction .... It
covered a period approximately 10 years in length, and not once during that period did
plaintiff either remove herself from the island or seek redress by resort to any traditional
tort action. Rather, she meticulously recorded each alleged event until, apparently, the
totality of defendant's conduct justified this action for money damages.").
142. Id. at 458-59.
143. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
144. Id. at 620.
145. Id. at 620 n.1.
146. Id. at 641 (Spector, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 640 (Spector, J., dissenting).
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Twyman "attempted to emotionally coerce [the plaintiff] into 'bond-
age' on an ongoing basis" and "engaged in a continuing course of
conduct of attempting to coerce her to join in his practices of 'bond-
age' by continually asserting that their marriage could be saved only
by [the plaintiff] participating with him in his practices of 'bond-
age.' 1 4' The trial court dissolved the marriage, divided the marital
estate, awarded child custody and support, and awarded the plaintiff
$15,000 plus interest for emotional distress. The intermediate appel-
late court affirmed, explicitly upholding the recovery for emotional
distress on a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
14 9
Mr. Twyman appealed.
While the case was pending before the Texas Supreme Court, the
high court in another decision refused to adopt the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in any context.'50 Consequently, the
court had to decide whether the judgment could be affirmed on alter-
nate grounds. As Ms. Twyman's pleadings were broad enough to en-
compass a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it was
on that theory that the supreme court analyzed whether it could sus-
tain the trial court's judgment. Five members of the eight-member
tribunal recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in the marital context. One justice agreed to recognize the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, but not in the marital
context, while two justices refused to adopt the cause of action at
all."5 More interestingly, however, a controlling plurality of three jus-
tices remanded the case to the trial court on the intentional infliction
claim, while two justices felt that the court could have affirmed the
intermediate appellate court's ruling and upheld the wife's recovery
for her husband's infliction of emotional distress under the inten-
tional infliction theory. While the plurality emphasized the trial
court's lack of findings on outrageous behavior and severe emotional
distress, the two other justices felt that the defendant's behavior was
outrageous as a matter of law.152 One judge, who rejected the adop-
tion of the tort in any context, summed up the contrasting opinions
with this comment: "[E]ven the Court itself is unable to say whether
the conduct complained of in this case either is, might be, or is not
148. Id.
149. Id. at 620.
150. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
151. Id. at 622 n.4.
152. Id. at 625.
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tortious. The fault lies in the principal element of the tort, the re-
quirement that a defendant's conduct be outrageous."
15 3
B. Domestic Violence is the Norm
As is evident from the above cases, some judges do not character-
ize domestic violence as outrageous conduct.154 Struggling with
whether a defendant's conduct is "truly outrageous," judges have ap-
plied the tort to the domestic context in a manner that has been de-
scribed as "somewhat controversial." 5' The prevalence of domestic
violence in our society explains, in part, the inconsistent case out-
comes and presents a major obstacle for domestic violence victims
who seek redress through use of the tort. Domestic violence is incred-
ibly common, as is society's tolerance of it. Murray Straus has written,
"[F] or many people a marriage license is a hitting license [and] physi-
cal violence between family members is probably as common as love
and affection between family members .... "a56 A survey conducted
for the U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence found that about twenty-five percent of the people inter-
viewed approved of a spouse hitting the other spouse under certain
circumstances.15 This figure is probably conservative due to underre-
porting.15 8 When one includes emotional abuse, domestic violence,
153. Id. at 639 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
154. See Kohler, supra note 13, at 1048 ("Battered women pursue claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress ... with little success.").
155. Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: Actions for Tortious Conduct Occurring During the
Marriage, 5 Am.J. FAM. L. 71, 73 (1991).
156. Murray A. Straus, Sexual Inequality, Cultural Norms, and Wife-Beating, in WOMEN INTO
WIVES: THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MARRIAGE 59 (Jane R. Chapman & Margaret
Gates eds., 1977). Straus summarized the tension as follows:
The norms and values relating to intrafamily violence pose something of a para-
dox. On the one hand there is what we have called the 'myth of family nonvi-
olence,'.., which reflects cultural norms and aspirations for the family as a group
characterized by love, gentleness, and harmony. On the other hand, there also
seem to be social norms which imply the right of family members to strike each
other and which therefore legitimize intrafamily assaults, at least under certain
conditions.
Id. at 61. Similarly, as the NewJersey Supreme Court recognized, "It is clear that the Amer-
ican home, once assumed to be the cornerstone of our society, is often a violent place."
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (N.J. 1984).
157. Straus, supra note 156, at 67 (citing R. Stark &J. McEvoy III, Middle Class Violence,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 4, 1970, at 52-65).
158. Straus, supra note 156, at 67 ("That figure [i.e., that 25% of those surveyed ap-
proved of one spouse hitting the other under certain circumstances] is probably a consid-
erable underestimate because of the existence of opposite and more socially acceptable




as well as society's acceptance of it, is virtually epidemic.'59 At least
one court has acknowledged explicitly that the prevalence of domestic
violence makes the tort's application problematic. The court in Hak-
kila stated, "Conduct intentionally or recklessly causing emotional dis-
tress to one's spouse is prevalent in our society. Thus, if the tort of
outrage is construed loosely or broadly, claims of outrage may be
tacked on in the typical marital disputes, taxing judicial resources. "160
It appears that male judges exemplify and perpetuate, to some
extent, society's tolerance of domestic violence, 6' and this tolerance
poses an obstable for plaintiffs seeking to establish the outrageousness
of the abuse. The New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women
in the Courts, while examining judicial attitudes in the context of the
implementation of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,'62 found
that judges exhibited "gender-based biases, stereotypical attitudes and
.. well intentioned ignorance."16 3 In particular, judges were insensi-
tive to the "dependency factors present in the abusive relationship.""64
They also often "trivialized the plight of the female as victim" because
it was a "domestic problem," and considered "what [the woman] did
to earn her beating."' 65 Furthermore, they failed to punish violations
of domestic violence orders in situations that "clearly would not be
tolerated except in the domestic context."' 66 The offending judges'
conduct supports one critic's opinion that " [ t] here is a general belief
[among judges] that if the woman was seriously abused, then she
159. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324-25 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); see also Schneider,
supra note 7, at 539 (noting that defining battering as an issue of power and control evi-
denced by emotional abuse and not physical violence "makes battering normal and
usual.").
160. Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 1324-25. Cf Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 755 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988) (failing to find a non-custodial parent's attempts to create a hostile relation-
ship between child and custodial parent outrageous because "it is a problem in almost
every marital case").
161. Indeed, because domestic violence transcends class boundaries, many judges them-
selves may be abusers. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lauryering, 81 CA.. L. REv. 1363,
1382 (1993) (book review).
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to 25-33 (West 1982, 1994 Supp.) The Act provides,
inter alia, civil restraining orders for domestic violence victims.
163. Lynn H. Schafron, Educating the Judicialy About Gender Bias: The National Judicial
Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts and the New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 109, 150 (1986).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. See also Frances Olson, Feminist Theoy in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1147,
1177 n.121 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987))
("'Domestic violence' is generally thought of and treated as less serious and less aberrant
than other forms of violence. The question is more often asked why women victims fail to
protect themselves than why the perpetrators commit the violence.").
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would leave; if she stays, then the abuse did not occur. "167 Anecdotal
evidence indicates that judicial insensitivity is rampant.' 68 To make
matters even worse, "[i]n the judicial system dominated by men, emo-
tional distress claims have historically been marginalized: 'The law of
torts values physical security and property more highly than emotional
security and physical relationships."'169 Even if a case survives pretrial
adjudication, the judge may give the issue of outrage to the jury,170
subjecting the domestic violence victim to lay misconceptions about
domestic violence.' The judge may also give a jury instruction on
outrage that is potentially detrimental to domestic violence victims.'
72
In sum, the male-dominated judiciary is predisposed to disfavor civil
claims by victims of domestic violence: "The legal system is dominated
by members of the same group engaged in the aggression. The prac-
167. Cahn, supra note 8, at 1985; see also Blair v. Blair, 575 A.2d 191, 192-93 (Vt. 1990)
(remarking on trial court's finding that plaintiff was likely exaggerating abuse, "as evi-
denced by the fact that she stayed throughout the four years of marriage").
168. For example, Judge Paul P. Heffernan of Somerville, Massachusetts, told the hus-
band of Pamela Dunn, "You want to gnaw on her and she on you, fine, but let's not do it at
the taxpayers' expense.' Ellen Goodman, Awards the Vety Best of the Worst to Mark of Anniver-
sary of Passage of Suffrage, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 1987, at A17. Pamela Dunn had
gone to court seeking a protective order and was ultimately killed by her husband. Id. See
also Chief Justice A.M. "Sandy" Keith, Domestic Violence and the Court System, 15 HAMLINE L.
Rv. 105, 110 (1991) ("Some attorneys, mostly male, responded to the Task Force survey
with the belief that women 'are crafty schemers who use the OFP [Orders for Protection]
proceeding to punish men or gain advantage in a dissolution proceeding.'") (footnote
omitted).
169. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 642 (Spector, J., dissenting) (citing Chamallas & Kerber,
supra note 88, at 814). See generally Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 88.
170. See, e.g., Richard L. v. Armon, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (refusing to
award plaintiff summary judgment on issue of liability and leaving the factual question of
"outrageousness" to jury where defendant had pled guilty to sexual abuse in the second
degree of a minor of less than 14 years and the court condemned that conduct as "truly
beyond the bounds of a decent society").
171. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (NJ. 1984) (acknowledging that "a battering
relationship embodies psychological and societal features that are not well understood by
lay observers. Indeed, these features are subject to a large groups of myths and stereotypes.
It is clear that this subject is beyond the ken of the average juror.").
172. For example, in Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the
trial court gave the following instruction in an emotional distress case:
The bounds of decency vary from legal relationship to legal relationship. The
marital relationship is highly subjective and constituted by mutual understand-
ings and interchanges which are constantly in flux, and any number of which
could be viewed by some segments of society as outrageous. Conduct considered
extreme and outrageous in some relationships may be considered forgivable in
other relationships. In your deliberation on the questions, definitions and in-
structions that follow, you shall consider them only in the context of the marital
relationship of the parties to this case.
While the plaintiff managed to recover $362,000 under this instruction, another jury




rice is formally illegal but seldom found to be against the law. The
atrocity is de jure illegal but de facto permitted."1 73
C. The Current Doctrinal Approach is Problematic for Feminism
Feminists face a dilemma when invoking the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as a remedy for domestic violence. 74
We may find it strategically advantageous to portray the plight of vic-
tims in terms of traditional gender roles in order to emphasize the
outrageousness of abusers' misconduct and enhance the chances for
recovery. On the other hand, such stereotypes help to perpetuate
legal and social disadvantages. By stressing women's moral purity, for
example, society can justify keeping women out of some rough-and-
tumble areas of the workforce. More insidiously, "lingering stereo-
types reinforce gender hierarchy by obscuring its dynamics. The re-
sult is that sex-based subordination appears natural and necessary,
rather than a consequence of societal construction and a subject for
societal challenge."175 Stereotypes also perpetuate a world view that
does not comport with the reality of most women's lives. For instance,
many women are single heads of households, and a vast majority of
women participate in both the private and public spheres.1 76 The
traditional public/private sphere dichotomy ignores this reality, and
allows courts to rationalize staying out of domestic violence issues alto-
gether. 77 It is similarly problematic to rely on doctrine that defines
domestic violence victims as hypersensitive, evoking the stigma of ab-
normality that the prefix "hyper" implies. Additionally, the current
doctrine creates perverse incentives for a victim who wants to increase
her chances for recovery: A domestic violence victim is more likely to
recover under current doctrine if she experiences repeated harass-
173. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1303 (1991) (referring to rape); see also CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TowARDS A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 161-62 (1989) (opining that the state, although appearing neutral
and objective, is "male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the way men
see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social
order in the interest of men as a gender-through its legitimating norms, forms, relation
to society, and substantive policies.").
174. See Finley, supra note 37, at 891 ("At times, [feminist] lawyers have found them-
selves constrained by the power of legal discourse . . .
175. Id. at 1755.
176. See supra note 95.
177. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 93, 101 (1987) (stating that "the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded
the place of battery, marital rape and women's exploited labor"). But see Gavison, supra
note 94, at 44 ("[T]he all-out fight against the vocabulary of public and private is unjusti-
fied, because the terminology is uniquely suited, precisely because of its richness and ambi-
guities, to make and clarify many of feminism's most fundamental claims.").
[VOL. 54:183
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PER SE OUTRAGE
ment or learned helplessness, rather than leaving an abusive
relationship.178
III. A NEW STANDARD FOR THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT: PER
SE OUTRAGE
A. A Description of the Standard
As noted above, almost all states have statutes authorizing civil
protection orders for domestic abuse, and protective orders are also
available in criminal cases.' 79 This Article's modest proposal is that a
willful violation of a civil protection order should constitute outrage
per se.18 1 Whenever a woman, or the state on her behalf, has ob-
tained ajudgment for criminal contempt or a conviction for the viola-
tion of a civil protection order, that conviction or finding of contempt
should suffice to establish the outrage element of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Alternatively, a woman should
be able to prove to a civil court, without first having obtained an order
of criminal contempt or a conviction, that the defendant willfully vio-
lated her civil protection order."8 ' This proposal would simplify the
determination of outrage and reduce the plaintiff's burden in proving
intent to inflict severe emotional distress, but would leave intact the
elements of severe emotional distress and causation. Adoption of the
per se standard would ensure that "the circumstances in which the
tort is recognized [are] described precisely enough ... that the social
good from recognizing the tort will not be outweighed by the un-
seemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims." 8 2
178. See supra notes 61-64, 82-85 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 210-211 and
accompanying text.
179. See supra note 38.
180. Certainly a more radical proposal is possible, such as one for strict liability for viola-
don of the civil protection order, or one where civil contempt, which does not require
willfulness, could be used to establish the element of outrageous conduct. WRIGHT, supra
note 24, § 771. Nor does the present proposal advocate that the first act of domestic vio-
lence be per se outrageous. Instead, it requires at least two acts of violence: the act that
led the woman to seek the order and the act that violates the order. The present proposal
is also not a blueprint for abolishing patriarchy, the most radical and perhaps the only
legitimate solution. See West, supra note 69, at 4 (arguing that abolition of patriarchy is
"the political precondition of a truly ungendered jurisprudence").
181. The Article adopts willful disobedience, as opposed to the civil contempt standard
which imposes liability unless the defendant shows his inability to comply, DAN B. DOBBS,
LAw OF REMEDIES § 2.8(7) (1993), because it is more consistent with the idea of an inten-
tional tort. To establish a willful violation, it must be shown that a court order exists, the
abuser had actual knowledge of the order, the abuser possessed the ability to comply, and
the abuser disobeyed the order. See, e.g., People v. Greenfield, 184 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982); DOBBS, supa, § 2.8(7).
182. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1326 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
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This approach has an analogy in the tort law of negligence. 183
The doctrine of per se negligence exists in most American jurisdic-
tions and allows a court to use the violation of a safety statute to assist
it in deciding one element of the tort. 84 Negligence per se applies
where a statute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any
person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others,
if he [or she] neglects to perform that duty he [or she] is
liable to those for whose protection or benefit it was imposed
for any injuries of the character which the statute or ordi-
nance was designed to prevent, and which were proximately
caused by such neglect.
1 85
Under a negligence per se rule, a defendant can be liable for certain
acts or omissions that might not qualify as negligence under the ordi-
nary reasonable person test,1 86 and the issue of reasonable conduct
need not go to the jury. Negligence per se is a bright-line rule. It
supplants the jury's subjective determination of reasonableness with
an objective standard. 7 While negligence per se establishes the exist-
ence of the defendant's breach of a legally cognizable duty owed to
the plaintiff, it does not establish liability.' 8 The plaintiff must still
show that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury or dam-
age sustained. 8 9
183. See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Violation of Statute or Ordinance Regarding Safety
of Building or Premises as Creating or Affecting Liability for Injuries or Death, 132 A.L.R. 863
(1941); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 286-90.
184. Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 319, 342 (1992).
185. Osborn v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 727
(1981).
186. Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
21, 27 (1949).
187. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 633 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring
and dissenting) (stating that in a negligence action ajury must find that the defendant was
careless); Morris, supra note 186, at 23.
188. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 727 (1981).
189. Id. Although this Article focuses on an intentional tort and not on negligence, and
although it looks at the nature of the conduct and not intent, and while it addresses the
violation of a civil protection order and not a statute, the analogy is useful. The analogy is
less helpful, however, on the issue of excuse. Under negligence per se, the tortfeasor can
rebut the presumption of negligence by showing justification or excuse, that is, that he or
she "did what might reasonably be expected of a person under ordinary prudence, acting
under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law." STUART M. SPEISER, 1
THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LoQUITUR § 1.8 (1972). Yet, under the Article's proposal,
a defendant's violation of the order would be excused only when it was not willful, or when
it fell within one of the other excuses generally associated with the law of contempt, e.g.,
inability to comply without fault on his part, 17 AM. JUR. 2D, Contempt § 161 (1990), or
vagueness of the order. Id. § 157.
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Just as a policy analysis must justify the adoption of negligence
per se, so too it must justify the per se rule of outrage: "If a civil
court's use of a criminal prosecution will result in a novel liability, this
liability is the creature of the court, and can be justified in the last
analysis only on policy." 190 Consequently, the advantages and disad-
vantages of the outrage per se standard require examination.
B. The Advantages of the New Standard
A per se standard of outrage offers many advantages. Adopting a
per se standard undoubtedly makes for more consistent outcomes in
this area of the law. As discussed above, the concept of "outrage" is
vague. 1
9 1
Outrageousness, like obscenity, is a very subjective, value-
laden concept; what is outrageous to one may be entirely
acceptable to another. To award damages on an I-know-it-
when-I-see-it basis is neither principled nor practical. The di-
verse perspectives present in a free society make decisions
about what is outrageous controversial and uncertain in all
but the clearest cases .... 192
The same jurist further remarked, "Because outrageousness is a sub-
jective, almost personal notion, its application is as much a matter of
who decides as of what happened."193 The per se standard eliminates
this subjectivity.
The per se standard will also facilitate recovery for victims. As
discussed above, the determination of whether conduct is outrageous
is for the judge at first instance.19 4 Manyjudges may harbor personal
views and prejudices about domestic violence and its victims that
make recovery difficult at present.1 95 The jury does not necessarily
regard a victim with any greater empathy.' 96 A per se outrage stan-
dard will help to remove the effect of these biases and
misunderstandings.
The per se standard of outrage also eliminates the need to tackle
the thorny issue of who is the "average member of the community,"
the benchmark against which the trier of fact evaluates conduct to
190. Morris, supra note 186, at 46-47.
191. See supra text accompanying note 57.
192. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 629 (Tex. 1993) (HechtJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 631 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 171.
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determine whether it is outrageous.197 An "average" male or female
member of the community is certain to bring to the analysis his or her
own gendered sensibilities. While little scholarly attention has fo-
cused on the community member's perspective in the context of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, the citizen's perspective is at
least as problematic in this context as in more familiar ones.19 To the
extent that jurors do not employ the viewpoint of a reasonable woman
in determining outrage under current doctrine, women may have
trouble recovering under the tort.199 On the other hand, relying on
197. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. d.
198. See Naomi R Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theoy and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398 (1992) (discussing the standard of the
reasonable woman in sexual harassment law, domestic violence law, and rape law); Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986) (noting that "[i]n rape, the male standard
defines a crime committed against women, and male standards are used not only to judge
men, but also to judge the conduct of women victims"); Finley, supra note 37, at 59 (argu-
ing that the perspective by which one judges the circumstances and reasonableness of ac-
tions can be important to outcome); Caroline Forell, Reasonable Woman Standard of Care, 11
U. TASMANIA L. Rv. 1 (1992) (proposing the imposition of a reasonable woman standard
of care in civil actions brought for sexual harassment, rape, offensive battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment); see also State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (requiring the jury to evaluate a murder defendant's "honest and
reasonable belief" in the need for self-defense from the domestic violence victim's perspec-
tive); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (same). Compare Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that in Title VII offensive work
environment claim "the trier of fact ... must adopt the perspective of a reasonable per-
son's reaction to a similar environment"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), overuled in part
by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that trier of fact must adopt perspective of the "reasonable
victim").
199. Women, more than men, tend to believe that an abuser's conduct is outrageous.
When what is involved is emotional or dignitary injury ... the socialisation
processes and power relations that women and men experience make many of
them perceive what is harmful quite differently. This is especially the case when
the harm is sexual or involves disparities in physical strength. Much male con-
duct which women find offensive is viewed by men and therefore the law, as
harmless and innocent.
Forell, supra note 198, at 5-6. As is true in the Title VII hostile workplace context, "a range
of social facts" makes the experience "distinctly different" for women and men. Abrams,
supra note 105, at 1202.
Unlike the reasonable person debate in other areas, advocates of the reasonable wo-
man standard in the emotional distress context may have authority for stating that the
perspective of a reasonable woman should determine outrage. When discussing the gross
insult rule applicable to common carriers, see REsrATEMENT, supra note 12, § 48, one emi-
nent commentator stated that the insult had to be a gross one, "of a kind highly offensive
to the ordinary reasonable man." Prosser, supra note 61, at 62-63. He then continued,
"The personality of the plaintiff is to be taken into account, and a man hardened to rough
language may be expected and required to endure more than a lady or a child." Id. at 63;
see also Magruder, supra note 46, at 1046 (suggesting that the plaintiff's gender should play
a role in the determination of defendant's liability); Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. Co. v. Bryant,
210 S.W. 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 1919) (holding that daughter, but not father, could recover
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the "reasonable woman standard" marginalizes those women whose
experiences differ from the "average" profile. 20 ' The per se rule of
outrage for violation of a restraining order sidesteps these pitfalls by
eliminating altogether the need to determine what is "outrageous."
The per se standard will also ease the plaintiffs burden in estab-
lishing the defendant's intent to cause emotional distress. To prove
that intent, the plaintiff will be able to employ, as circumstantial evi-
dence, the fact that the defendant willfully violated the civil protection
order. Traditionally under the tort, a defendant could argue that he
neither intended to inflict emotional distress, nor knew of facts indi-
cating a high probability that such distress would occur.20 1 Under the
per se outrage standard, however, a domestic violence victim's secur-
ing of a civil protection order puts the abuser on notice that any viola-
tion of it will likely inflict emotional distress. Therefore, by
establishing that the abuser intended to violate the order, the domes-
tic violence victim has a powerful argument that the abuser acted with
substantial certainty that severe emotional distress would result from
his conduct.
Moreover, the per se standard addresses the concern of some that
it is impossible to draw lines circumscribing permissible conduct in a
domestic relationship. Discord can result from a variety of behavior,
and when discord arises, it is inevitable that parties will suffer emo-
tional distress.20 2 Some of this distress is not actionable. 20 3 A per se
rule clarifies which conduct is actionable and sets reasonable limits on
for exposure to coarse language in a train depot); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 48 cmt. c
("[L]anguage addressed to a pregnant or sick woman may be actionable where the same
words would not be if they were addressed to a United States Marine."). In addition, the
gender of the plaintiff has been deemed relevant to assessing damages in domestic vio-
lence assault and battery cases. See Duplechin v. Toce, 497 So. 2d 763, 767 (La. Ct. App.
1986), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 86 (1987) (listing victim's gender as one factor to consider in
assessing damages).
200. See genera//y Cahn, supra note 198. Of course, there is no "reasonable woman stan-
dard" applicable to all women, regardless of class, race, ethnicity, and so forth. See Susan
Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 846 (1991) (noting that for some courts "the
objective standard of pervasiveness is defined by an idealized woman who simply may not
exist"). For example, discrimination against women of color in the job and housing mar-
kets makes domestic violence against women of color more outrageous, as discrimination
reduces a woman of color's means to extricate herself from the violence. Schneider, supra
note 7, at 533.
201. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. i ("The rule [of § 46] applies where the
actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such distress
is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct.").
202. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 627 (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting)
(stating that "the fact finder is left to draw a virtually impossible distinction between recov-




behavior. Under this proposal, an abuser's menacing conduct would
not be per se outrageous unless it had occurred at least twice: once
before the woman obtained her civil protection order, and once more
after she obtained the order.20 4
By labeling the violation of a restraining order outrageous, the
per se rule not only describes the behavior as socially unacceptable,
but provides a normative standard.2 15  "[T]he term 'outrageous' is
neither value-free nor exacting. It does not objectively describe an act
or series of acts; rather, it represents an evaluation of behavior. 2 6
This normative standard will reinforce the legislative responses to the
problem, and will place violation of a civil restraining order in the
category of behavior that is "so outrageous in character, and so ex-
treme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity." °2 7 Then violation of a restraining order meant to protect a
domestic violence victim (and perhaps, by extension, domestic vio-
lence generally) will take its rightful place among the examples of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct listed in the Restatement:
for one person to tell another, as a practical joke, that the
other's spouse has been badly injured in an accident and is
in the hospital with both legs broken.., for a man, knowing
of another person's pathological fear of men in women's
clothing, to dress as a woman to surprise and startle the
204. The need for at least two acts of violence comports with some courts' policy of
allowing divorce only where the cruelty was severe enough. See Brown v. Brown, 56 S.E.2d
330, 333-34 (S.C. 1949) (holding, on physical cruelty count, where husband slapped wife
twice and pinched her, "It is not every slight violence, however, committed by the husband
or wife against the other, even in anger, which will authorize the divorce. It is generally
held that a single act of physical cruelty does not ordinarily constitute ground for divorce,
unless it is so severe and atrocious as to endanger life, or unless the act indicates an inten-
tion to do serious bodily harm or causes reasonable apprehension of serious danger in the
future."); H.D. Warren, Annotation, Single Act as Basis of Divorce or Separation on Ground of
Cruelty, 7 A.L.R.3D 761, 765 (1966) (stating that most courts follow the rule in Brown, and
that some states have statutes requiring repeated acts of cruelty before a court will author-
ize a divorce on that ground). But see Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 248 A.2d 75, 76 (N.H. 1968)
(stating that when husband choked his wife twice, "There is no doubt that actual violence
committed on a spouse by the other attended with danger to life or limb can constitute
extreme cruelty .... Undoubtedly, in most instances extreme cruelty consists in a course
of conduct rather than in a single act. However acts of violence need not be persistent, or
become a fixed habit, or be many in number, before they can be said to constitute extreme
cruelty authorizing a divorce on that ground . . ").
205. Compare Austin, supra note 88, at 5 (suggesting that tort of outrage would serve a
useful "pedagogical function" by helping to legitimize workers' claims to respectful treat-
ment by supervisors).
206. Givelber, supra note 12, at 51.
207. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. d.
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other person . . . for the president of a rubbish collectors
association to summon a member to a meeting, accuse him
of working in another member's exclusive territory, and
threaten that if he does not pay over what he has earned he
will be physically beaten and his business destroyed.., for a
man to give a woman a bathing suit which dissolves in water,
leaving her naked in front of strangers . . . for a person to
"hex" the farm of a superstitious landowner to force him to
sell it .... 208
By adopting the per se standard of outrage, the courts will validate
domestic violence victims' descriptions of their experiences and pro-
mote the ethics of responsibility and care within intimate relation-
ships. By protecting domestic violence victims and promoting those
values, the law will help strengthen the community. 20
9
The per se standard is also an empowering standard, helping to
remove the general power imbalance that exists between a domestic
violence victim and her abuser. Under current law, the abuser may
continue his harassment of the victim in court by denying that his acts
in violation of a restraining order were wrong or that he intended to
cause his victim distress. A per se rule would minimize any opportu-
nity for such mendacity. In addition, the proposed standard encour-
ages a victim to extricate herself from the relationship, unlike current
doctrine which creates an incentive for a woman to stay in order to
benefit in her tort action from the pattern of harassment or from hy-
persensitivity attributable to the Battered Woman's Syndrome.2 1 0 The
incentive under the per se standard of outrage is to obtain a civil pro-
tection order, which usually enjoins any contact between the parties
and can evict the abuser from the home.2 11 Also, because the per se
standard does not depend upon stereotypes of women to convince a
court that the conduct is outrageous, the per se standard reinforces
the notion of gender equality between the parties.
208. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 631 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring and
dissenting) (listing examples of extreme and outrageous conduct from RESTATEMENT, supra
note 12, § 46 cmt. d, illus. 1-3, & cmt. f, illus. 10, and suggesting that judges' views about
the outrageousness of such acts would differ).
209. West, supra note 69, at 66.
210. Some authors want to import the Battered Woman's Syndrome into the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 13, at 1030 (argu-
ing that "the Battered Woman Syndrome should be used ... as evidence of emotional
distress"). That suggestion provides a counterproductive incentive, encouraging women to
stay in abusive relationships in order to increase their chances for recovery.
211. Finn, supra note 16, at 44.
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C. Arguments Against the Approach
This proposal undoubtedly will encounter resistance. Arguments
against it will include the following: (1) victims explicitly or implicitly
consent to the violence; (2) many violations of civil protection orders
are not violent or outrageous; (3) the per se standard will flood the
courts with litigation; (4) the rule will disrupt domestic harmony; (5)
the rule will create confusion in other areas of family law; (6) the tort
will be used primarily against women; (7) the tort will be unavailable
to women without civil protection orders; (8) the per se rule usurps
the courts' authority to enforce their orders; and (9) the proposal is
not radical enough. This section attempts to show that all of these
arguments lack merit.
The first criticism, that victims somehow consent to abuse, rests in
part on age-old notions about domestic relations.
Although a husband has no right, and consequently no privi-
lege by virtue of the marital relation, to beat or chastise his
wife or to deprive her of her liberty, it does not follow that
there is no privilege arising from the marital relation. It is a
matter of common knowledge that the conduct of husband
and wife toward each other generally is different from that of
strangers. Every motion would not be an assault, nor every
touching a battery, although they might be such in particular
cases if the parties were strangers. There would be a consid-
erable amount of express or implied consent due to the fact
of the marital relation, and even where there was lack of ac-
tual consent the relation would license much conduct.21 2
212. McCurdy, supra note 39, at 1055. A similar idea emerged in the marital rape con-
text. See Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1650, 1661 (1966)
(explaining that a husband's immunity from prosecution for raping his wife arose from
traditional notions of marital consent and contract). Cavalier acceptance of apparent con-
sent to physical violence is still common. For example, the following appeared in an Ann
Landers column in the 1970s:
Dear Ann Landers: Come out of the clouds, for Lord's sake, and get down here
with us humans. I am sick to death of your holier-than-thou attitude toward wo-
men whose husbands given them a well-deserved belt in the mouth.
Don't you know that a man can be pushed to the brink and something's got
to give? A crack in the teeth can be a wonderful tension-breaker. It's also a lot
healthier than keeping all that anger bottled up.
My husband hauls off and slugs me every few months and I don't mind. He
feels better and so do I because he never hits me unless I deserve it. So why don't
you come off of it? - REAL HAPPY
Dear RH.: If you don't mind a crack in the teeth every few months, it's all
right with me. I hope you have a good dentist.
Straus, supra note 156, at 63 (quoting Ann Landers (Oct. 29, 1973)).
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It also rests on the erroneous belief that victims actually enjoy the
abuse they suffer: "Some popular misconceptions about battered wo-
men include the beliefs that they are masochistic and actually enjoy
their beatings, that they purposely provoke their husbands into violent
behavior, and ... that women who remain in battering relationships
are free to leave their abusers at any time.""'3 While such stereotypes
are unworthy of response, the consent argument deserves an answer
because of its effectiveness in the context of marital rape. Even assum-
ing that the victim had consented to abuse at one time, her consent
dissipates "when notice is given that all such conduct will no longer be
tolerated." 4 A woman gives such notice when she obtains a civil pro-
tection order, if not long before. Moreover, "even if consent were to
be implied to certain emotional 'rough-housing,' if defendant exceeds
that consent and does a substantially different act ... the consent is
void."2 15 In addition, "[a]cts made criminal for the protection of a
certain class of persons simply cannot be consented to."2 16 As the con-
senting party is not in pari delicto with the abuser, the traditional basis
for the consent rule is undermined.21 ' Finally, as a normative matter,
public policy should not permit a consent defense to bar recovery.218
Another possible argument against the per se rule is that not all
violations of civil protection orders are outrageous. Violations of a
civil protection order can take many forms. The orders usually pro-
scribe a range of behavior, including being near the plaintiff and call-
ing her.219 Should a defendant who violates an order requiring no
telephone contact be held to have acted outrageously for making a
213. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 370 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 19-
31 (1979)). Writers have pursued these stereotypes for ages.
In the female sex there is consequently an instinctive appreciation of manly
strength and courage; this is found in most women, and they may enjoy the dis-
play of manly force even when it turns against themselves. It is said that among
the Slaves of the lower class the wives feel hurt if they are not beaten by their
husbands; that the peasant women in some parts of Hungary do not think they
are loved by their husbands until they have received the first box on the ear; that
among the Italian Camorrists a wife who is not beaten by her husband regards
him as a fool.
EDWARD WESTERMARCK, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE IN WESTERN CrVILISATION 94 (1936); see
also LECLERCQ, supra note 73, at 311 n.34 (indicating that certain women must be beaten by
their husbands to feel loved).
214. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 114 (5th ed.
1984).
215. Cole, supra note 12, at 569 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12, at 104 (4th ed. 1971)).
216. KARP & KARP, supra note 33, at 61.
217. KEETON ET AL., supra note 214, § 18, at 122, 124.
218. Id. at 124.
219. See supra note 16.
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single telephone call? Would not the "[i]ndiscriminate allowance of
actions for mental anguish encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial
hurts"?22° Such concerns are exaggerated. This proposal still re-
quires that a victim of domestic violence prove her severe mental
anguish, as well as causation and intent. These elements of the tort
will "minimize the problems of distinguishing the true from the false
claim and the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong."22 ' Lest it
be forgotten, the per se rule can be invoked only after the violation of
a civil protection order that itself was predicated on prior domestic
violence. Therefore, a pattern of harassing activity between parties
who are in a special relationship automatically exists when the civil
protection order is violated. Regardless of the way in which an abuser
violates his victim's civil protection order, the fact that he willfully vio-
lates it and thereby furthers a pattern of abuse is outrageous.2 2 The
earlier violence cannot and should not be forgotten, nor is it irrele-
vant to her claim for emotional distress. 22 ' The initial civil protection
order is always predicated on physical abuse, threatened or attempted
physical abuse, or sexual abuse.224 In order to obtain a civil protec-
tion order in Washington, D.C., for example, one must establish the
existence of an intrafamily offense, which the statute defines as a crim-
inal offense between family members.225 While a violation of a civil
protection order may consist of a noncriminal offense, such as dis-
obeying the stay-away provision, often the violation consists of yet an-
other criminal offense. In fact, it is recognized that "domestic
220. Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ill. 1961). Yet as that same court continued,
"[A] line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society
and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in social
utility." Id. at 164.
221. Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503, 521 A.2d 1246 (1987).
222. In his famous 1956 article Insult and Outrage, William Prosser summarized the liabil-
ity imposed upon collection agencies and other creditors for high-pressure collection
methods, remarking that although only one small occurrence might have triggered the
lawsuit, "[iit is seldom that any one such item of conduct is found alone in a case, and the
liability usually has rested on a prolonged course of hounding by a number of extreme
methods." Prosser, supra note 61, at 48-49 (footnote omitted). The same holds for land-
lords evicting tenants and insurance adjusters seeking to force a settlement. Id. at 49. Sim-
ilarly, although one small event may ultimately violate the civil protection order, that
occurrence is intrinsically part of the history of violence that induced the domestic vio-
lence victim to seek a civil protection order in the first place.
223. Even under the traditional formula for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, some courts recognize that violence long since past, perhaps even barred by the
statute of limitations, is still relevant to the emotional distress claim. See, e.g., Henriksen v.
Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1142 (1993).
224. Finn, supra note 16, at 60-63.
225. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1005 (1989).
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violence escalates." 22 6 Even assuming, arguendo, that some violations
of civil protection orders are trivial, the abuser always has the defense
that the violation of the order should be excused. For example, the
defendant could explain that the violation was not willful, e.g., he en-
countered the plaintiff by chance and had no reason to know of her
presence. 27
Another possible criticism is that the use of the per se standard
will flood the courts with cases. Yet no flood of litigation resulted
from the abrogation of interspousal immunity, although tortious phys-
ical violence is common in many deteriorating marriages.228 In any
event, this fear is not a sufficient justification to reject the standard.
The plight of domestic violence victims needs remedying, and admin-
istrative convenience is not a compelling reason to reject the per se
standard. 22 '9 The plaintiffs burden of proof for the remaining ele-
ments of the tort should protect "against unwarranted, meretricious
or merely vindictive litigation. "230 Moreover, dire predictions of frivo-
lous litigation assume that domestic violence victims have a motive to
bring baseless claims, and that courts will be unable to recognize mer-
itless lawsuits.
A further concern is that the availability of the tort for victims of
domestic violence will disrupt domestic tranquility. Courts have rec-
ognized the fallacy of such an objection:
The danger that the domestic tranquility may be disturbed if
husband and wife have rights of action against each other for
torts, and that the courts will be filled with actions brought
by them against each other for assault, slander, and libel...
we think is not serious. So long as there remains to the par-
ties domestic tranquility, while a remnant is left of that affec-
tion and respect without which there cannot have been a
true marriage, such actions will be impossible. 23'
Moreover, as another court observed, "When a spouse inflicts inten-
tional harm upon the person of the other spouse, peace and harmony
226. Clark, supra note 20, at 290-91.
227. See supra notes 180, 188.
228. Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
229. Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546-47 (quoting WiLLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971)). Cf Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 736
(Mich Ct. App. 1988) (tort may exist in the context of a non-custodial parent's attempt to
foment discord between the custodial parent and child because "the implicit threat of an
avalanche of cases, arising whenever one parent makes an uncomplimentary remark about
the other, simply is not perceived by us as seriously undermining society or its laws").
230. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d at 606.
231. Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 891-92 (Conn. 1914).
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in that home has been so damaged that there is little danger that it
will be further impaired by maintenance of an action for damages."23 2
Other jurists have expressed doubt that personal injury suits between
spouses damage marital harmony any more than the property and
contract actions courts have traditionally permitted.233
Some courts have disfavored the tort, and will likely challenge the
per se standard, on the ground that it may resurrect fault as an issue
in divorce proceedings, 234 or that it will "obfuscate the issues of cus-
tody, support, and division of community property."2 3 5 The related
debates about the value of the no-fault divorce system and the means
by which a court can best remedy tortious conduct during a marriage
when a divorce action between the parties is pending (or has con-
cluded) go beyond this Article's scope and have already attracted
scholarly attention.23 6 Courts permitting the tort action have taken
different approaches to the problem and have arrived at different so-
lutions.23 7 The concern, therefore, serves less as an impediment to
232. Ebert v. Ebert, 656 P.2d 766, 766-67 (Kan. 1983) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 647
P.2d 1346, 1348 (Kan. 1982)); see also Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Me.
1993) (" [B] ehavior that is 'utterly intolerable in a civilized society' and is intended to cause
severe emotional distress is not behavior that should be protected in order to promote
marital harmony and peace.") (footnote omitted); Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d
646, 650 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) ("[T]here can be little sanctity remaining when the rela-
tionship becomes the source of wanton violence.").
233. See Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (1986); Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d
597, 601 (N.Y. 1936) (Crouch, J., dissenting).
234. Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
235. Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (denying intentional
infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action in a divorce action).
236. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 79; Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103 (1989);
Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56
U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1987). See also Barbara H. Young, Classification of Personal Injury Awards in
Divorce Actions, 27 J. FAM. L. 489 (1988-89) ("The landmark cases in this area give little
guidance on how to coordinate such tort suits and divorces."); Schepard, supra note 20, at
130-31; Orsinger, supra note 54, at 1295.
237. Compare Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993) (tort action and divorce
action permissible but should not be joined in a no-fault state) with Twyman v. Twyman,
855 S.W. 2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993) (encouraging the actions be brought together). See also
Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis.
1988) (persuasively arguing "if an abused spouse cannot commence a tort action subse-
quent to a divorce, the spouse will be forced to elect between three equally unacceptable
alternatives: (1) commence a tort action during marriage and possibly endure additional
abuse; (2) join a tort claim in a divorce action and waive the right to ajury trial on the tort
claim; or (3) commence an action to terminate the marriage, forego the tort claim, and
surrender the right to recover damages arising from spousal abuse. To enforce such an
election would require an abused spouse to surrender both the constitutional right to a
jury trial and valuable property rights to preserve his or her well-being. This the law will
not do."). In states that allow fault grounds for divorce, or that recognize fault in property
distribution, a court might want to guard against double recovery in a subsequent tort
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the adoption of a per se rule than as a warning to victims who chose to
use it of the various procedural obstacles that might arise in their at-
tempt to do so.2"'
A more troubling criticism of the per se rule is that if the tort
becomes more visible in the domestic violence context, it may be used
predominantly against women. Women's principal method of fight-
action by allowing the defendant to raise by way of affirmative defense that the tort and the
fault grounds are the same, and thereby attempt to obtain a set-off against a plaintiff's
judgment. See, e.g., Goldman v. Wexler, 333 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Mich Ct. App. 1983). This
seems like the best alternative because tort remedies may not automatically afford suffi-
cient compensation for marital wrongs recognized in fault divorce statutes. Young, supra
note 236, at 515, 510 (discussing Murphy v. Murphy, 547 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1976)).
238. Any domestic violence victim who is divorcing her batterer and wants to sue him
must carefully inquire into whether the cause of action is permissible and what is the best
procedure for bringing it. She must consider whether interspousal immunity bars the ac-
tion. See generally supra note 40. She must also examine whether a state allows, permits, or
requires the tort action to be brought during the divorce action, e.g., whether the state
excludes all fault from all aspects of the divorce proceedings. Some states consider fault
relevant in a property division or maintenance determination even if the grounds for di-
vorce are no-fault. Compare Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Mich. 1992) (holding
fault as one factor relevant to the disposition of assets) with In re Marriage of Williams, 199
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972) (holding fault is not relevant to the disposition of assets) and
Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Wis. CL App. 1987) (noting spousal abuse is relevant
to maintenance payments under no-fault divorce code but not to disposition of assets).
Additional issues are whether a tort claim is an asset that needs to be reduced to judgment
in order to value the marital estate or to determine child support or maintenance, and
whether the statute of limitations will run if the action is brought after the divorce. A
woman who wants to bring suit prior to or during her divorce must also consider whether
her recovery will come from the community's estate or from the separate property of her
spouse, and whether it will become her separate property or community property. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126(c) (West Supp. 1983) (excluding interspousal tort awards from
community property); Orsinger, supra note 54, at 1306-07. Similarly, the domestic violence
victim who already has divorced but wants to bring an action for marital violence must
carefully consider whether a general release in a divorce settlement agreement or resjudi-
cata bar the action. See, e.g., NJ. R. Crv. P. 4:38-2(a); ALA. R. Crv. P. 42(b). Currently a split
exists among state courts as to whether an individual can litigate a tort claim after his or
her divorce. A majority of courts hold that the suits involve different causes of action, and
resjudicata does not apply. See generally Schepard, supra note 20, at 130-31; Orsinger, supra
note 54, at 1295. See, e.g., Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993) (holding
intentional infliction of emotional distress action based on domestic violence not barred by
interspousal immunity or res judicata). However, a significant minority of courts apply a
same-transaction test and bar the tort claim as res judicata. See generally Schepard, supra
note 20, at 130-31; Orsinger, supra note 54, at 1295. It seems, however, that a no-fault
divorce action and a tort action would be sufficiently different in terms of proceedings,
remedies, and operative facts to avoid the problem of resjudicata. Young, supra note 236,
at 500; Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d 1180 (Idaho 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by
State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992) (making a narrow exception to resjudicata
for tort actions following a divorce); Stuart, 410 N.W.2d at 636 ("[Tlhe divorce and tort
actions lack an identity of causes of action or claims. Applying the resjudicata doctrine to




ing back against their abusers is verbal: "It must be acknowledged...
that the wife too possesses means of making her husband suffer and of
exasperating him; nor are they any less efficacious because less muscu-
lar."2 9 Abusive language can be actionable under the tort,24 ° and
men do make claims under the tort.241 It is therefore possible that
abusers may invoke the per se standard to harass their victims. Such a
risk seems rather insubstantial, however, given the costs of litigation
and the plaintiffs burden of proof. Such cases undoubtedly are dis-
tinguishable from cases involving true domestic violence. In addition,
if judges carefully limit the issuance of civil protection orders to de-
serving plaintiffs, e.g., by refusing to award mutual restraining orders
and screening out frivolous applications, the use of the per se rule by
men should not be a problem. 42 Finally, the risk that men will use
the civil system to harass women appears to be no greater under this
Article's proposal than under the status quo.
One further disadvantage of the proposal is conceivable: If the
violation of a civil protection order is per se outrageous, conduct
outside of the per se category may be deemed not to be outrageous as
a matter of law. Courts must avoid this result by recognizing that
much misconduct is outrageous even if the victim obtained no civil
protection order in advance, or even if the civil protection order did
not prohibit the particular conduct. Again, negligence per se pro-
vides a useful analogy. While compliance with a safety statute is evi-
dence of due care, it "does not necessarily preclude a finding that the
239. LECLERCqO supra note 73, at 311.
240. See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Civil Liability for Insulting or Abusive
Language-Modem Status, 20 A.L.R.4TH 773, 780-81 (1983 & Supp. 1993) (noting that 24
states allow recovery for mental distress, regardless of physical consequences, by a person
to whom abusive language is addressed).
241. See, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (husband sued
wife for adulterous behavior); Jones v. Jones, 62 N.H. 463, 467 (1883) (husband sued wife
for her sudden departure during second week of marriage, taking his clothing, accusing
him of bigamy, and threatening to pursue him "to the prison walls"); Ruprecht v. Ru-
precht, 599 A.2d 604 (N.J. Super. 1991) (husband sued wife for adulterous behavior); Wal-
iser v. Tada, 1990 WL 20080 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1990) (husband sued battered
women's shelter alleging that shelter intentionally inflicted emotional distress by refusing
to disclose whether his wife was there); Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (husband sued wife for wife's announcement, in divorce petition, that he was not
the father of her child); Pournaras v. Pournaras, Nos. 49936, 49937 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
19, 1985) (husband sued wife for his arrest andjailing on domestic violence charges, which
his ex-wife later dropped); Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (hus-
band sued wife for obtaining an abortion without his consent and deceiving him as to her
intention regarding her pregnancy).
242. See generally Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for
Domestic Violence but Mutual Restraining Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039 (1992).
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actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions."2 43 The
per se standard should encourage women to obtain civil protection
orders, but should not preclude the cause of action for those who do
not have such an order or for those women whose abusers' actions do
not fall under one.
In addition, courts may resist the per se rule because they believe
it usurps their authority to enforce their orders. Courts traditionally
address violations of court orders through contempt proceedings,
which if criminal in nature are meant to vindicate the authority of the
court.24 4 Any benefit to the plaintiff from such proceedings is usually
incidental. Therefore, a court may perceive a plaintiffs advocacy of
her own interests by suing in tort for her abuser's disobedience of a
court order as a usurpation of its authority. Such was the situation in
Kukla v. Kukla,245 in which a wife brought an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of her husband's alleged
violation of a mutual restraining order entered in a divorce action.
The order provided that the parties were "mutually restrained from
annoying and harassing each other in any way and more specifically,
from telephoning the other."246 The plaintiff alleged that her hus-
band harassed her by "repeatedly calling her on a car telephone fur-
nished by his employer and by 'coming to her house and acting in a
threatening and intimidating manner."''1 7 The trial court dismissed
the complaint with prejudice, stating that the plaintiff could not bring
her action in circuit court, but rather had to bring it in the domestic
243. KEETON ET AL.., supra note 214, at 233 (5th ed. 1984). Morris, supra note 186, at 42-
46. Cf Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21J. LEG.
STUD. 319, 344 (1992) ("[T]he mere fact that the legislature has not declared an activity
unlawful does not warrant an inference that it is not negligent to engage in that activity
under ordinary circumstances, let alone an inference that it is never negligent to do so.").
244. See Edward Gregory Mascolo, Procedures and Incarceration for Civil Contempt: A Clash
of Wills Between Judge and Contemnor, 16 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171, 177
(1990) ("[S]anctions for criminal contempt are punitive in character and are imposed to
vindicate the authority and dignity of the law and a court."); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The primary purpose of criminal
contempt is to punish past defiance of a court's judicial authority, thereby vindicating the
court."); Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670, 675 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) ("purpose of
criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court"). However, some recognize
that civil contempt also can vindicate the court's authority. G-K Prop. v. Redevelopment
Agency, 577 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kennedy, J.). The entire distinction between crimi-
nal and civil contempt is rather blurred. State v. Bullis, 315 N.W.2d 485, 487 (S.D. 1982);
Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and
Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 121 (1992) (confusion on this distinction between
criminal and civil contempt has been widespread).
245. 540 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).




relations division.248 The appellate court clarified that the trial court
was only disallowing forum shopping, holding that when "the conduct
underlying the tort action has been regulated by a previous order of
the domestic relations court, that court retains jurisdiction to fashion
relief for a violation of its order."249 Yet, the appellate court contin-
ued, "Defendants also correctly maintain that the contumacious viola-
tion of an injunction does not give rise to damages to the party
offended by the violation. ... 'The established rule in Illinois is that
the court may imprison or fine for contempt of its orders but is with-
out authority to recompense [plaintiff] for his damages.' 25 °
To the extent that a jurisdiction only permits criminal contempt
proceedings and not civil contempt proceedings for a violation of a
civil protection order,251 and to the extent that a jurisdiction follows
the reasoning in Kukla, the proposal in this Article may not be
adopted. Yet even for those ten jurisdictions which allow only an ac-
tion for criminal contempt and not civil contempt, the holding in
Kukla is misguided. Illinois explicitly permits both criminal and civil
contempt for the enforcement of civil protection orders.252 More-
over, the holding denies a remedy to anyone who has previously ob-
tained an injunction. The rationale for such a result is unclear. While
requiring a plaintiff to institute both the contempt proceeding and
her tort proceeding in one court may conserve judicial resources, 253
there are two distinct interests to be vindicated.254
248. The trial court stated,
I would have to sustain the motion to dismiss this for the simple reason that those
statutes that you pose have absolutely nothing to do with, as far as I am con-
cerned, with allegations of a complaint that really seeks a remedy that belongs in
the court of domestic relations. All these allegations are strictly those of harass-
ment, of non-compliance with court orders in the court of domestic relations and
alleged physical and mental anguish and-physical injury and mental anguish as
a result thereof. If we were to rule otherwise, we'd open up the floodgates to the
law division to everyone who has a domestic relations matter to come into this
court for compensatory damages based upon non-compliance with court orders
in the court of domestic relations. And obviously, that can't be done at all.
Id. at 511.
249. Id. at 512.
250. Id.
251. Only ten states allow criminal contempt proceedings, without also allowing civil
contempt proceedings, for violation of a civil protection order. Finn, supra note 16, at 65.
252. Finn, supra note 16, at 64; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/223(b) (Smith-Hurd
1993).
253. This was particularly true in Kukla, where the plaintiff filed her complaint during
the middle of the divorce trial.
254. Even requiring both causes of action to be brought at once potentially puts the
plaintiff at a disadvantage, for defendants in criminal contempt actions have certain crimi-
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Finally, some critics may desire a more radical proposal,255 and
ask the question: why must victims of domestic violence seeking re-
covery under the tort surmount an "outrage" test at all? Not every
emotional distress tort requires such a showing. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, section 48, entitled "Special Liability of Public Utility for
Insults by Servants," allows recovery for gross insults inflicted by a pub-
lic utility's servant acting within the scope of his or her employment,
irrespective of whether the employee's conduct is "outrageous," if the
insults "reasonably" offend the plaintiff.256 Insults for which recovery
has been allowed include profane language, and even for the epithet
"[a] big fat woman like you."257 Professor Prosser described the basis
for this special rule as "obviously" being the following:
the responsibility undertaken by the carrier toward the pub-
lic, which carries with it an obligation of courtesy that does
not rest upon ordinary defendants; the unusual power and
opportunity afforded the carrier to wound the feelings of
those entrusted to its care; and the interest of the public in
freedom from insult at the hands of those with whom it must
come in contact, and on whom it must rely for essential
help. 258
nal procedural protections, whereas defendants in purely civil actions might not have such
procedural protections. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988).
255. See supra note 180. The reform suggested arguably does not reflect a feminist point
of view. It speaks the language of current legal doctrine, and implicitly tolerates, for the
time being, a level of violence that many feminists may find unacceptable. Yet the proposal
reflects a pragmatic approach that may receive political or judicial support, and it reduces
the power imbalance between the sexes. "Since law inevitably will be one of the important
discourses affecting the status of women, we must engage in it. We must pursue trying to
bring more of women's experiences, perspectives, and voices into law in order to empower
women and help legitimate these experiences." Finley, supra note 37, at 907. To the ex-
tent feminism implies a commitment to equality between the sexes at the substantive level,
and to gender as a focus of concern at the methodological level (including women's con-
crete experiences), see Rhode, The "No Problem"Problem, supra note 91, at 1735-36, the sug-
gested reform is profoundly feminist.
256. "A common carrier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing
its facilities for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the utility's servants
while otherwise acting within the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT, supra note
12, § 48.
257. See Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & light Co., 65 So. 225 (1914) (cited in Prosser, supra
note 61, at 62 n.133). See generally WJ. Dunn, Annotation, Civil Liability for Insulting or
Abusive Language Not Amounting to Defamation, 15 A.L.R.2D 108, 132 (1951).
258. Prosser, supra note 61, at 60. Prosser so concludes after discussing Chamberlain v.
Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413, 414 (C.C. Mass. 1893). In that case, the master of a ship insulted
and mistreated his passengers. He was liable because he had contracted for transportation
and also for "decency of demeanor." Prosser, supra note 61, at 59. Subsequent cases relied




This reasoning could apply with similar force to the intimate rela-
tionship. One entering such a relationship has an obligation of cour-
tesy to his or her partner. The partners have an unusual power and
opportunity to injure each other's feelings.259 The public also has an
interest in ensuring that physical and emotional safety exist once par-
ties enter such a relationship. 6 '
Yet adopting the equivalent of section 48 of the Restatement as a
remedy for victims of domestic violence is not the best avenue for
changing the law. Simply, it goes too far to award damages for all
gross insults in the domestic context. The risks of flooding the judici-
ary and infringing on liberty counsel against such a proposal.261
Moreover, the application of the gross insult rule would not lessen the
need to rely on stereotypes of women to enhance a victim's chances
for recovery. Rather, the proposed per se rule occupies a middle
ground between the current interpretation of outrage, and the peril-
ously broad standard of section 48.
In sum, while the objections to the per se standard vary in merit,
none presents a compelling reason not to adopt it. Rather, the argu-
ments against the standard warn feminists and the courts to apply the
standard vigilantly and in a manner consistent with the legislative pur-
pose of the civil protection order remedial schemes. The advantages
of the new standard-including more consistent outcomes, rational
line-drawing in intimate relationships, easing of the plaintiff's burden
in proving outrage and intent to inflict severe emotional distress, es-
tablishment of a normative standard, and empowerment of women-
all justify its adoption.
259. See supra text accompanying note 66.
260. See Demos, supra note 97, at 43-60 ("(W]e have isolated family life as the primary
setting-if not, in fact, the only one-for caring relationships between people.").
261. See Bernstein, supra note 56, at 1765. The author explains that the Supreme Court
balances censorship of ideas with a recipient's need for spatial privacy by removing the
government's power to "regulate the intrusion of offensive ideas into the spatial privacy of
the recipient unless the speaker has received actual, specific notice from the individual
recipient not to communicate such an idea to him." A civil protection order provides just
such notice, making constitutional concerns minimal under the per se rule. Besides, the
per se rule prevents those words
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace .... [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citing Z. C~rkEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNrrED STATES 149-50 (1941)).
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CONCLUSION
At first blush, the current formulation of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress may seem to be a useful cause of action
for domestic violence victims because several potential arguments for
the outrageousness of domestic violence presently exist. However, do-
mestic violence is depressingly common in our society, hindering the
tort's successful application, and the best chance for establishing its
outrageousness under current law may require victims to invoke tradi-
tional stereotypes of dependency and helplessness that ultimately dis-
advantage women. That courts have inconsistently applied the tort
for domestic violence victims' benefit indicates the need for reform.
The per se standard of outrage for the willful violation of a pro-
tection order is a modest proposal for improving domestic violence
victims' chances for recovery. It removes an unwarranted obstacle to
recovery and helps empower domestic violence victims. It also pro-
tects courts and potential defendants from unjustified suits by preserv-
ing the requirement that the plaintiff prove the remaining elements
of tort. Finally, the proposal establishes a normative standard clearly
expressing society's intolerance of the continued abuse of women who
have obtained and relied upon court orders for their protection.
There is simply no good reason to inquire further into the issue of
outrage when an abuser has violated such an order.
1995]
